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1. Introduction
1.1	 A	debate	of	global	significance	
The impact of geopolitical manoeuvrings, even those on a massive scale, was until recently 
relatively	limited	by	the	natural	firewall	of	global	geography.	It	was	just	not	possible	for	an	
event resulting from such machinations to impact every person in every corner of the globe. 
The	phenomenon	of	modern	globalisation,	however,	has	shattered	that	containment	field.	
Geopolitical	debates	now	have	the	potential	to	hold	true	global	significance.	When	such	
debates emanate from a country with a seemingly unlimited economic, military and cultural 
global	reach,	with	the	purpose	of	influencing	foreign	policy	with	respect	to	the	entire	world,	
the realisation of this potential is inevitable. A perfect example of such a debate commenced 
in the United States after the end of the Cold War; a discourse ostensibly concerning what 
the U.S. should do with its newfound status of sole superpower, in turn what world order 
would result and where the UN should stand within that world order. Mostly missing from 
these debates was the direct involvement of practitioners of an academic discipline that had 
experienced a growth spurt coinciding with the growth of modern globalisation—world 
history. This is somewhat surprising, as there is a natural harmony between world history—
which	investigates	arenas	of	global	significance—and	geopolitics,	which	in	the	case	of	the	
American debates on the role of the U.S. and the UN in the modern world order, is an arena 
of	global	significance.	It	raises	the	question	of	whether	world	history,	both	through	its	visions	
of the world and the histories behind them, is helpful to the understanding of geopolitical 
debates,	and	the	motivations	and	influences	of	the	actors	behind	them.	Is	knowledge	of	world	
history	important	when	considering	geopolitical	debates	of	global	significance?	
The backdrop to these debates is globalisation. It is the nature of the world shaped by this 
phenomenon	that	extends	their	already	huge	political	and	social	significance	to	a	global	scale.	
The scope and reach of modern globalisation has never been witnessed before, a phenomenon 
that has become accepted knowledge—a rare global consensus that traverses national 
borders and all segments of society and in itself is an example of globalisation at work. The 
world has reached a point in time where, metaphorically at least, borders between nations 
and civilisations appear to have been breached at a number of levels, including economics, 
culture and the transmission of ideas, thus creating new dynamics affecting the entire world. 
A side effect of this metaphoric debordering has been an increased emphasis on difference, 
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5manifest in a general rise in national, ethnic, religious and cultural parochiality. When the fact 
that many elements of globalisation have occurred within the guidelines and often under the 
auspices of nation states is considered, a paradox becomes clear.  The global village is bound 
to exist within a nation state paradigm. 
It	is	in	this	environment	that	geopolitics,	with	its	long	and	chequered	history,	continues	to	
play a role in the shaping the world. One of the most important issues in this arena today is 
the role of the U.S. and the related role of the rest of the world. After the end of the Cold 
War, the U.S. found itself with a disproportionate geopolitical and military power balance 
in its favour, which when combined with economic power and cultural reach that had been 
developing	since	the	end	of	the	Second	World	War,	gave	it	a	unique	place	in	world	history.	
Never before had such a country held such perceived power, effectively over the entire world, 
and by association, the world’s people, inspiring calls of ‘global hegemon’ that can be heard to 
the present day. 
There was and remains much debate as to what America should do with this new post-
Cold War world dominance, primarily how to ensure the continuance of  this position. 
Within the context of  these debates, there stood on the horizon only one body that 
could be argued to represent the people of  the entire globe—the UN. As the only truly 
global body representing sovereign state units that has the power to authorise—in certain 
circumstances—military intervention, peacekeeping and economic sanction, as well as 
being at the forefront of  global initiatives in education, health and human rights, to name 
but a few examples—the UN was bound to be in their sights. As such, the UN and its 
relationship with the U.S. in this new post-Cold War world stands front and centre in 
debates concerning America’s rightful role in the world. What makes these debates globally 
significant	is	that	even	though	they	are	outwardly	trying	to	forge	American	public	and	
political opinion behind the implementation of  foreign policy, such policy would, because 
of  the combination of  American power and unlimited scope of  globalisation, resonate 
throughout the world in a manner that previous so-called ‘global hegemons’, from the 
Pax Romanus to Pax Britannia, could never hope to achieve. Which in itself  creates another 
paradox. A debordering planet seemingly moving away from the primacy of  the nation 
state	creates	the	condition	where	an	understanding	of 	geopolitics	of 	global	significance	
becomes more important for understanding the nature of  that debordering planet.
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Concurrent to, although not necessarily as result of this wave of globalisation was the rise of 
the historical discipline of world history, although in its modern form it predates the post-
Cold	War	era,	in	many	ways	addressing	some	of	the	same	questions	that	the	morbus philosophus-
historicus—in the words of Frank Manuel1—had been attempting to answer for centuries. If 
ever there was a time when world history and writers of world history should have something 
to	contribute	to	geopolitical	debates	of	a	global	significance,	it	should	be	now.	Not	only	
may world history make it possible to uncover all relevant and causal antecedent and related 
actions that frame the geopolitical debates such as those on American foreign policy, as well 
as cultural and economic connexions, but individual world historical treatises that include a 
vision of the contemporary globe are talking about the very world arena that the debates are 
operating within. 
Modern world historical writing has for the most part steered clear of syntheses based 
upon geopolitics and the political sciences in general. This is partly understandable from 
an academic standpoint if one considers the long-held phobia in the history academy for 
involvement in debates with a future—and somewhat telelological—focus.2 As part of long 
overdue efforts at addressing the overemphasis on politics and the nation state in traditional 
history writing, world history as a historical discipline has literally widened the net, utilising 
a far larger selection of foundational cores, including trade, migration, gender, ethnicity and 
identity.	The	connections	that	made	the	respective	region	or	human	subject	group	as	it	was	at	
the time of the phenomenon studied, charting sometimes multiple courses of that transition 
or progression, has rendered world history based upon geopolitics a somewhat endangered 
species. This is not to suggest politics no longer plays a role in world history writing, in its 
institutionalised form it remains involved, as an actor or by merely providing the environment 
and the boundaries of the particular world historical narrative. 
There are still writings produced based upon the traditional and now out-of-fashion 
paradigms of nation state and politics. Two such works are The End of History and the 
Last Man, by Francis Fukuyama, and The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World 
Order, by Samuel Huntington. It was into the relative vacuum of the post-Cold War 
world	order	that	these	two	highly	contentious	works	first	appeared,	striving	to	map	out	
a global vision for the future. Though vastly different treatises, both works, through 
their presentation of patterns of global change supported by historical development, 
were	founded	upon	and	are	reliant	on	world	history.	Their	emergence,	influence	and	
7success	made	them	difficult	to	ignore,	with	a	resonance	that	echoes	even	today.	What	
appears to have been ignored is the world historical foundations supporting their theses. 
How	do	the	ideas	of	Huntington	and	Fukuyama	relate	to	the	debates	in	question?	As	
both works purport to map out world order scenarios, something the debates strive to 
influence,	can	understanding	the	world	history	behind	these	works	be	beneficial?	
It	is	probable	that	people	influenced	by	The Clash of Civilizations and The End of History did 
not consider their world history foundations and focussed rather on their universal history-
like future premonitions. Notwithstanding, the world history supporting their respective 
treatises remains vital, and is inseparable from their overall syntheses. Conversely, even if 
practitioners	of	world	history	spurn	these	works,	as	they	did	with	the	preceding	high	profile	
attempts at a future global vision, such as those by Arnold J. Toynbee, H.G. Wells and 
Oswald Spengler, they are still founded upon world history, and regardless of their academic 
palatability are representative of world history as a practice. Therefore, it remains to be argued 
that understanding world history, in this case via the bridge built between world history and 
geopolitics by Fukuyama and Huntington, is important in forming a deeper understanding of 
geopolitical	debates	of	global	significance;	debates	where	the	ideas	of	the	two	men	can	be	seen	
at almost every turn. 
1.2 Tackling the problem. A multifaceted approach
There is no single approach to such a synthesis as this, as it involves several distinct and 
multidimensional	segments.	Whereas	the	analysis	of	the	American	debates	requires	a	fairly	
standard debate analysis, with a supplemental comparative analysis in order to establish 
debate positions, the world history component needs a historiographical analysis, in order—
in effect—to establish itself. Add to that a review of The End of History and The Clash of 
Civilizations, necessary to attach them to discipline of world history and to geopolitical debates 
of	global	significance,	and	a	degree	of	empirical	research	throughout	for	substantiation,	and	
the result is an epistemological smorgasbord. Each component of this study also has different 
temporal scales, leaving but one area of consistency throughout—the spatial. This is a study 
of debates concerning the relationship between the U.S., as a sovereign state; the UN, an 
international organisation currently comprising 192 sovereign states; and planet Earth, 
covering all peoples, administrative units, collectives and cultures. Although such debates are 
not	confined	to	the	U.S.,	this	work	is	focussed	entirely	on	the	American	domestic	debate.	The	
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essence	of	this	study	is	encompassed	by	the	following	paradigm;	how	the	U.S.	and	the	UN	fit	
together	at	the	figurative	summit	of	planet	Earth.	Overlaying	all	of	this	is	a	non-geographic	
space,	the	academic	field	of	world	history	writing.	
The temporal scales of this study need to be broken down by segment. The American debates 
concerning the UN date back to the very establishment of the organisation. A dramatic 
upsurge in this discourse commenced with the end of the Cold War, and the momentum 
continues unabated. Therefore the temporal focus of this part of this study is the debates 
concerning	this	relationship	from	1991	to	2007;	the	first	significant	blow	was	Charles	
Krauthammer’s article, “The Unipolar Moment”, which appeared in Foreign Affairs in 1991. 
Fukuyama and Huntington’s contributions came in book form in 1992 and 1996 respectively; 
although they were both monographs developed from previously published articles. A 
historical scale has been chosen to run concurrently with this, namely 1991-2007, as a study 
of this size could not hope to cover the relevant antecedent causal history. The temporal scale 
of the historiographical world history component is longer. In order to establish world history 
as a discipline, the nascent modern works from the 1950s and 1960s need to be considered. 
Finally, as both The End of History and The Clash of Civilizations cite many philosophers with a 
world historical vision, if not modern world historians per se, it is necessary to extend this 
temporal scale back centuries.
Analysing the American debates is a relatively straightforward task. There are so many 
competing voices from the political arena, academia, policy institutes and think tanks that 
the	most	difficult	task	here	was	to	choose	which	ones	to	include.	In	turn	the	vehicles	used	
to	communicate	their	beliefs	range	from	academic	journals	through	to	cable	news	television.	
Hence this section is perfectly handled by a simple debate analysis, which involves sourcing, 
analysing	and	categorising	what	has	been	said	or	written	with	regards	to	the	subject	at	hand.	
Added to this is an even simpler form of comparative analysis, which establishes distinct 
categories within the debates. Here the discourse is analysed against both other discourses 
and academic commentary on those discourses.
Establishing what world history actually is, in order to give it context within these debates, 
requires	a	historiographical	analysis.	Two	types	of	writings	are	considered,	world	histories	
themselves, and historiographical commentary on world history writings. This is also 
important when establishing the world historical foundations behind The End of History and 
The Clash of Civilizations;	for	which	a	basic	review	of	both	is	sufficient.	This	will	enable	them	
to be connected to world history writing, and will set the scene for them to be placed within 
9the context of the geopolitical debates that are the focus of this work. The actual underlying 
history is studied through empirical research, to locate the actions that frame the situation 
within which the debates occur. Empirical research is also used to substantiate the similarity 
of ideas, most importantly to link Fukuyama and Huntington to key players and positions 
within these debates. This is the only true way to establish these concrete connections, short 
of interviewing both Fukuyama and Huntington and the actual players in the debate, which 
falls outside the scope of this work. 
This work contains elements of history, world history, historiography, political science, 
international relations, as well as a smattering of both political philosophy and philosophy of 
history. A broader study of this topic would ideally consider international law, economics and 
sociology, and perhaps philology. All of which is consistent with both works of global nature 
and	to	world	history	writing,	as	such	questions	of	global	significance	are	inherently	difficult	
when	confined	to	one	discipline.	One	final	note,	as	English	is	the	primary	language	of	the	
debates	themselves,	as	well	as	the	majority	language	of	the	U.S.,	all	sources	used	here	were	
originally delivered in written or spoken English.
1.3 State of play. Literature review
The multifaceted nature of this thesis posed a challenge when establishing a state of the art 
for	literature.	As	it	is	clear	that	no	specialised	academic	journal	could	possibly	cover	such	a	
broad arena, there can be no state of the art literature review for this overall thesis topic. As 
this work has individually delineated sub-sections, it was imperative to establish the state of 
the art for each of the individual sub topics that make up this treatise, and the only way to do 
this is by a cross-discipline analysis. In this case, that meant seeking out articles concerning 
Huntington and Fukuyama, and world history in general, in the leading relevant political 
science,	foreign	policy	and	international	relations	journals.	Conversely,	the	major	world	
history	journals	have	been	reviewed	to	establish	whether	there	are	any	arguments	regarding	
geopolitical	debates	within	world	history,	or	specifically	Fukuyama	and	Huntington	in	this	
context. If there are arguments with a common thread, then it can be deduced that this 
problem,	in	a	general	sense	if	not	specifically,	has	been	previously	recognised	and	addressed.	
This	thesis	is	restricted	by	scale,	therefore	it	was	necessary	to	limit	the	number	of	journals	
consulted.	Only	the	leading	English	language	journals	in	each	field	have	been	researched.	
It can be argued that if the themes at the core of this thesis are not visible here, they are not 
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being	debated	at	the	pinnacle	of	these	disciplines.	Three	world	history	journals	were	reviewed,	
the Journal of World History, the Journal of Global History and	the	online	journal	World History 
Connected. To establish whether this argument has been raised in the more general academic 
history community, The American Historical Review, has also been analysed. Finally, History and 
Theory has been investigated, due to the theoretical and sometimes philosophical nature of 
both	Fukuyama	and	Huntington’s	work.	On	the	foreign	policy	side	two	journals	have	been	
studied in depth, Foreign Affairs and International Affairs. To complete this analysis Political Science 
Quarterly and The Journal of Politics were chosen from the political science arena.
The end result of this initial research is that this particular synthesis has never been 
attempted—there	is	no	real	corpus	of	writings	specific	to	this	topic.	However,	when	
combined	with	the	more	specific	research	on	the	individual	elements	that	make	up	this	
thesis, enough articles have been written that indicate that this is a viable topic for study. 
An example of a pertinent article is one by John Gray, entitled “Global utopias and clashing 
civilizations: misunderstanding the present”, which appeared in International Affairs ( Jan 
1998).3 His argument considers the world historical foundations of both Fukuyama and 
Huntington with respect to the global political system of the 1990s, displaying an excellent 
if rare application of world historical models to geopolitical situations. In a similar vein was 
“World History in a Global Age”, by Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, from The American 
Historical Review (Oct 1995).4 This offers both an overarching state of the art of world history 
writing at the time, and an establishment of the relationship of power and international 
politics to the historical notions of nationalism, state borders, and histories written for a 
national purpose. From the United Kingdom, thereby not technically within the scope of the 
U.S. debate, are many works from Paul Kennedy; the most notable being his 2006 work The 
Parliament of Man. The Past, Present and Future of the United Nations.5 Some world historical works 
on empires take contemporary geopolitical considerations into account. One recent example 
is Yale law Professor, Amy Chua’s Day of Empire: How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance – and 
Why They Fall.	Chua,	who	equates	‘empire’	to	the	dominant	power	in	the	world	at	that	time,	
comparing the U.S. to ten such ‘empires’ stretching as far back as the Persians and Romans.6 
For the most part, however, all matters political and nation state have generally taken a back 
seat with regards to being the primary focus of modern world historical writings.
In terms of analysing and categorising world history as a historiographical concept, in order to 
help establish the link between the works of Fukuyama and Huntington and world historians, 
there is a multitude of resources available. Like all academic disciplines, world history is both 
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introspective and self-critical. For background here, the 2005 edition of Palgrave advances in 
world history, edited by Marnie Hughes-Warrington, is invaluable, offering multiple perspectives 
on	world	history	that	make	hazarding	a	definition	an	easier	task.7 Patrick Manning’s 2003 
work, Navigating World History. Historians Create a Global Past, and the 1998 collected work World 
History. Ideologies, Structures, and Identities, edited by Philip Pomper, Richard Elphick and Richard 
Vann, also provide detailed conceptual maps of world history writings.8 Volume 34, Number 
2, of History and Theory, a special theme issue entitled “World History and its Critics”, is 
notable for a vigorous defence of The End of History by the author himself—a rare excursion 
by either Fukuyama or Huntington outside the world of foreign policy and political science 
journals.9 Both men have felt compelled to defend themselves in print and in interviews, 
a notable example being Huntington’s “If Not Civilizations, What? Samuel Huntington 
Responds to His Critics”,10 a bold challenge to his critics to come up with a viable alternative 
to his ‘clash of civilisations’ thesis.
In the American debates concerning the UN and its role in the modern world relative to the 
U.S., there is an embarrassment of sources, so much so that the largest challenge here was 
deciding at what point critical mass was reached. To prioritise the participants in these debates 
and the nature of their messages, it was necessary to step back and establish whether any 
clear and consistent positions on American foreign policy, or ideological groupings, could be 
ascertained, and to what degree these positions related to their opinions concerning the UN. 
Here John van Oudenaren’s article, “Unipolar versus Unilateral”, Policy Review (April & May 
2004) was invaluable,11 providing the categorisation typology for the analysis of the debates, 
breaking them down into four different groupings, which we will later return to in greater 
detail.	Van	Oudenaren	also	provides	a	related	list	of	influential	actors,	primarily	from	the	
academic side.12 Investigation of these cited authors uncovered a wealth of work concerning 
where the chosen author believed America should stand with regards to the modern world, as 
well as the role of the UN in that world.13 From these four general positions on U.S. foreign 
policy,	two	positions	specifically	concerning	the	UN	can	be	distilled.	
It appears that when it comes to the UN almost everybody in this arena had something to 
say.	Political	figures	contribute	heavily	to	this	discourse,	for	example	candidates	in	the	2008	
Presidential elections such as Hillary Clinton14 and John McCain.15	Foreign	policy	officials	
(current and former) are heavily involved, including Clinton-era Secretary of State, Madeleine 
Albright,16 not to mention recent U.S Ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, a notable critic 
of the UN, infamous for a 1994 speech where he suggested that if ten stories of the United 
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Nations	headquarters	were	destroyed,	it	would	not	make	one	bit	of	difference.17 Media pundits 
have also been heavily involved in these debates,18 as have numerous academics.19 In addition, 
Ian Hurd, from Northwestern University—a leading specialist on the history of the UN 
from an international law standpoint—weighs in often to these debates from the historical 
perspective of the relationship between the U.S. and the UN and the actual role of the UN as 
specified	by	it’s	charter.20
The	journal	Foreign Affairs is an indispensable resource for works on the issue of world power 
polarity as well as lateralism, and has seen many future geopolitical visions grace it’s pages. 
Standing out from amongst a bank of relevant materials is Niall Ferguson’s, “The Next War 
of	the	World”,	essentially	a	Huntington-style	prediction	of	how	the	twenty-first	century	
world will manifest.21 Foreign Affairs has	also	featured	many	articles	specifically	relating	the	
core writings of Fukuyama and Huntington to foreign policy as it happened.22 Actual links 
between Fukuyama and Huntington and the actors in these debates can be ascertained by 
analysing personal and professional relationships the two writers had with these actors. 
There are ample and easily accessible references to these connections.23  
1
2.		Terms	&	definitions,	debate	positions,	actors
2.1	Terms	and	definitions
As	the	subject	matter	of	this	work	is	term-heavy,	it	is	important	at	this	juncture	to	clarify	
some	of	the	terms	used	throughout.	Definitions	for	bodies	such	as	the	UN	or	sovereign	
states such as the U.S. need not be rehashed here. However, there is much terminology 
specific	to	the	debates	in	question,	as	well	as	terms	connected	to	the	works	of	Fukuyama	and	
Huntington	and	others	relevant	to	the	fields	of	world	history	and	geopolitics	that	require	
clarification.	As	this	study	is	reliant	on	the	detailed	formulation	for	common	characteristics	
for world history writing, the term ‘world history’, in reference to the academic sub-discipline 
of professional history, will be detailed separately in Chapter 3. The expansive nomenclature 
displayed by the world history profession will also be addressed in this section; most 
importantly the distinct yet related world history sub-groups of global history and speculative 
philosophy of history. 
In modern and more common parlance geopolitics	refers	to	the	relationship	and	influence	of	
political power, history and social sciences to the politics and policy agendas of international 
relations.	The	‘geo’	refers	to	geography;	specifically	geographic	boundaries	such	as	national	
borders, the impact of natural resources, land geography and human geography on politics. 
The spatial aspect of this work is the entire globe, hence we speak of geopolitical debates 
of	global	significance—in	this	work	the	debates	concern	global	power	relations	between	
international political administrative units, primarily sovereign states but also international 
organisations such as the UN. In its highest academic form geopolitics is focussed more on 
pure geographic indicators such as resource availability; however it could be argued that this 
makes	no	difference	to	the	definition	offered	here.	In	a	globalised	world	it	would	be	naïve	to	
think that geopolitics of any level is not driven to a large degree by geography, provable by 
one	salient	example—the	importance	of	oil	to	the	interventions	in	Iraq	in	1991-1992	and	from	
2003 to the present.
With	regards	to	the	American	debates	in	question,	there	are	several	important	terms	used	
throughout	this	work.	The	first	two	are	based	upon	polarity, which refers to how power is 
distributed in a global system. Unipolar refers to global dominance by one sovereign nation, 
bipolar by two, and multipolar by more than two.1 The normal facets of polar power are the 
subject	of	debate,	but	can	generally	be	considered	as	unsurpassed	military	and	economic	
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capabilities, resources strength (people, land, commodities), and a high level of competence 
in	managing	the	above	fields	of	power.2 Some commentators include strong soft power as 
a mandatory condition. Soft power is subtle—for example cultural transfer, back-room 
diplomacy, leading by example, even sometimes agreeing to a global consensus not in line 
with standing national policy.3 Contrasting soft power is hard power, which is plainly visible, 
working by inducement and threat,4 utilising such tools as standing armies or trade sanctions. 
How a polar power, indeed any sovereign nation, practices international co-operative politics 
at the collective level of nation states is called lateralism. In it’s most simple form, unilateralism 
reflects	a	country	going	it	alone	on	an	international	issue,	whereas	multilateralism refers to 
countries working together by consensus, often through umbrella organisations such as the 
UN, the World Trade Organisation or the International Monetary Fund.5 Lateralism becomes 
problematic where international law and treaties are concerned. To give a hypothetical 
example,	if	five	countries	were	to	sign	a	free	trade	agreement	with	a	particular	state	in	
defiance	of	UN	sanctions,	their	action	as	a	collective	body	of	five	against	the	UN	can	be	seen	
to be unilateral,	whereas	their	cooperation	as	a	body	of	five	is	multilateral. 
The best manner in which to illustrate how polarity works is by outlining a brief history of 
international power politics at the global level since the Second World War. Until 1945 the 
world power system was multipolar, with the strongest nations striving to counterbalance the 
power of like countries, in some instances these competitors were also considered threats. 
After the Second World War two great power blocks emerged, centred upon the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union.  This was the bipolar world system, where other traditional world powers fell 
far behind in terms of hard power indicators. Although these countries could still challenge 
their respective hegemon in certain circumstances,6 such challenges never came close to 
threatening the world power system or the dynamic within the respective hegemonic orbits. 
It	also	became	difficult	for	a	second-level	power	to	operate	independently	within	the	
hegemon’s sphere of interest—as Britain and France found when they attempted to intervene 
during the Suez Crisis in 1956. This bipolar system lasted until the sudden collapse of the 
Soviet Empire, an event that caught most foreign policy experts and policy makers by surprise.
2.2 Where four goes into two. Categorising the American debates
As previously noted, the debates concerning the role and place of the U.S. in the world with 
regards to the UN are a central component of the larger debate of what the U.S. should do 
to preserve its place in the world, painting a picture of how the world is viewed by different 
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stratas of American society. As previously noted, John van Oudenaren devised an unwieldy 
yet	highly	descriptive	classification	system,	segmenting	the	debate	into	four	general	groups:	
unipolar unilateralists, who insist that unilateralism is the only way to protect American interests, 
which	are	in	turn	beneficial	for	the	world;7 unipolar multilateralists, who believe the continuance 
of	American	primacy	is	best	served	by	restraint	and	judicious	use	of	the	international	system;8 
multipolar unilateralists, notable for a combination of isolationists and those that believe that 
unipolarity as a concept is impossible;9 and multipolar multilateralists, who believe in a return to 
a traditional great power system where existing and emerging great powers will be best served 
by working together.10  
It is necessary to outline the differences between the unipolar unilateralists and the unipolar 
multilateralists	in	this	section,	because	these	differences	have	shaped	the	recent	trajectory	of 	
U.S. foreign policy. The unipolar unilateralists believe that American power has passed a tipping 
point, which no other country—for the foreseeable future—can counterbalance.11 Without 
fear of  competition at a global level, active maintenance of  American global hegemony will 
result in an extended Pax Americana. Their primary tool is military supremacy.12 The unipolar 
multilateralists, on the other hand, believe that if  the U.S. is considerate of  the needs of  other 
nations (whilst never being subservient), it will ward off  potential challengers to American 
global primacy by the very good of  the example set by its approach.13 Both camps ascribe 
to Hegemonic Stability Theory, which postulates that the world is best served by a single 
dominant nation which can keep the world stable by its very hegemony, such as by maintaining 
a reserve currency.14 For both groups, this theory supposes willing co-operation by states.15  
These positions drive all debate on geopolitical issues of a global scale in the U.S., as they 
cover all the possible permutations when working within a nation state based world system. 
Whilst the actors representing these positions are not always in complete agreement on every 
single	issue	and	sometimes	in	conflict,	displaying	the	multiple	personality	of	these	debates,	
they are very much their ideological nerve centre. In the case of discourse concerning the 
UN, these four positions can be distilled into two; Antagonists, notable for their agitation for 
radical reform of the UN, with some tending towards abolition; and Protagonists, who although 
supportive of the UN, still counsel moderate reform. Whilst these two groupings form the 
typology for the analysis of the discourse, they are inexorably connected to the four overall 
positions on American foreign policy outlined above.
The following table displays this dynamic, and highlights why both the four-position typology 
of Van Oudenaren and the Antagonist/Protagonist model need to be referred to throughout 
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this work, for actors sharing the same position on the UN may have formulated that stance 
from entirely different perspectives of U.S. foreign policy. 
Table 1.1: SegmenTaTion of american debaTeS on foreign policy and The Un
Position with 
regards to U.S. 
foreign policy
Unipolar 
unilateralist
Multipolar 
unilateralist
Unipolar 
multilateralist
Multipolar 
multilateralist
Position with 
regards to the UN
Antagonist Protagonist
Actors
• Primarily Republicans
•  Foreign policy experts and pundits 
with Republican leanings
•  Selected political science, 
international relations and 
international law academics
• Primarily Democrats
•  Foreign policy experts and pundits 
with Democrat leanings
•  Selected political science, 
international relations and 
international law academics
These	debates	also	showcase	how	interdependent	the	UN	is	to	questions	of	the	role	of	the	
U.S. in the world. Even when the UN is not mentioned by direct address in a particular 
discourse, the very nature of the debates means that whatever is said or written must have a 
connection to a position on the UN. There can be no debate on a new world order without 
the	UN	as	a	constituent	element,	as	the	machinations	leading	to	the	2003	Iraq	conflict	
displayed in abundance. On matters of global management in the post-Cold War world, the 
UN and the U.S. are inexorably linked. For example, if one is proposing a new international 
body of democratic states, like-minded to the U.S., a ‘League of Democracies’, per se, its 
motivation must have as a foundation an opinion of the worth of the UN.
2.3 Where do they stand? Segmenting the actors
The range of actors in these debates is as diverse as the mediums in which this discourse 
can be found. They range from politicians, policy advisors and government bureaucrats, 
to academics and what can be loosely termed pundits. As this is a debate considering the 
relative	strength	and	influence	of	the	U.S.	with	relation	to	the	UN	in	the	contemporary	
world, it is an almost essential policy consideration for American politicians, especially 
those	with	foreign	policy	responsibilities	or	designs	on	the	highest	office	in	the	land.	
The three most prominent candidates in the 2008 U.S. presidential election primaries, 
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Senators John McCain, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama, have all stated their positions 
on the role of the UN. Their policy decisions should they become President put them on 
an inevitable collision course with this issue; the successful candidate will have to face 
the	issue	of	the	UN	to	perform	the	functions	of	the	office	of	United	States	President,	
just	as	current	President	George	W.	Bush	and	his	predecessor	Bill	Clinton	(indeed	all	
their post-Second World War predecessors) have done. In short, McCain is an Antagonist 
and the two Democratic candidates Protagonists. Joining them on the national stage 
are members of the various Congressional bodies that oversee different levels of foreign 
policy, such as the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. These members are either 
active in these debates through Committee business or independent initiative.16 
Serving	elected	officials	are	tied	to	policy	not	only	though	resolutions	of	the	House	
of Representatives and the Senate, but through the work of the un-elected (though 
confirmed	by	Congress)	foreign	policy	community,	primarily	the	State	Department,	but	
also	increasingly	in	modern	times	the	Department	of	Defence.	Again,	the	job	of	these	
people, from the respective Secretaries down, is two-fold. They are the departments 
responsible for enacting laws passed by Congress on the approval of the President, at the 
same time they are developing policy on behalf of the executive branch of the government 
for	debate	in	Congress	at	the	behest	of	the	President.	Their	very	jobs	are	welded	to	the	
issue of the UN. As they are the departmental face of the national government, they 
are not only contributing to these debates by word but also by action. Notable vocal 
administrators in this discourse include former Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, as 
well	as	former	Defence	Department	officials	such	as	Paul	Wolfowitz	and	John	Bolton.17 
For the most part the academics at the head of  these debates are from schools of  political 
science, government and international relations, such as Joseph Nye from Harvard, John 
Ikenberry from Princeton, and Charles Kupchan from Georgetown. Notable exceptions 
include the historian Niall Ferguson from Harvard, who is also a member of  the American 
Enterprise	Institute;	a	major	player	in	these	debates	taking	what	is	commonly	known	as	the	
neo-conservative position, and Jan Nederveen Pieterse, global sociologist from the University 
of  Illinois. Of  course Fukuyama and Huntington can be added to this list. The demarcation 
between	this	group	and	policy	officials	is	also	muddied,	as	many	academics	active	in	this	
discourse have worked in federal government institutions. For the most part, it can be stated that 
these contributions to the overall body of  discourse have been academically sound and balanced.
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There	are	also	many	overlaps	between	the	final	grouping	of	actors	in	these	debates—the	
pundits—and	policy	formulators	and	academics,	with	one	major	distinguishing	characteristic;	
this	group	is	specifically	pushing	an	agenda	in	order	to	influence	opinion;	impartiality	is	not	
a concern here. Often this agenda belongs to the policy institute or think tank to which the 
respective actor belongs. These actors can be found espousing their views across various 
mediums	ranging	from	selected	academic	journals	through	to	mass	circulation	newspaper	
and magazine articles. In addition, pundits have become experts-on-tap for the emerging 
and	influential	world	of	cable	news	channels	in	the	U.S.,	which	include	Fox	News,	MSNBC	
and CNN, being called upon for authoritative comment in pursuit of an opinion, often 
in preference to academics or working policy personnel. Although these particular actors 
wear	their	agenda	on	their	sleeves,	this	is	not	to	suggest	that	they	are	without	qualifications	
to support their positions. Many of them, whilst not practicing academics, have doctoral 
qualifications,	such	as	William	Kristol;18	have	worked	as	journalists	covering	areas	of	
significance	to	these	debates,	like	Jonah	Goldberg;19 or have had working experience in 
politics and international relations. Exemplifying the latter are Patrick Buchanan, former 
White House Chief of Staff to Richard M Nixon and advisor to Ronald Reagan, and Charles 
Hill, former U.S. special envoy to the UN.20  
These	debates	are	noteworthy	for	the	absence	of	practicing	historians,	specifically	
practitioners of world history.21 The most notable exception to this trend, apart from Niall 
Ferguson,	is	Paul	Kennedy,	author	of	several	world	historical	monographs	specific	to	
international relations. Kennedy’s contributions to this discourse can be traced to his thesis 
of	American	imperial	overstretch	first	proposed	in	1987	in	The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. 
As for world history itself, the most important debates from a historiographical standing have 
been introspective, focussed on what exactly makes world history distinct from traditional 
academic	history.	In	turn,	such	self-defining	debate	has	spread	into	questions	of	terminology,	
and demarcation between supposedly different forms of world history. This discourse is 
ongoing and far from settled, typical of a relatively new sub-discipline trying to establish 
itself in the academic community, especially one trying to differentiate itself from its parent 
discipline and employing such a varied multidisciplinary approach. Indeed, opinions on what 
world history actually is vary to such a degree that one could form the impression the world 
history	community	is	reticent	to	nail	down	a	common	definition.	It	is	because	of	this	lack	
of	an	agreed	common	definition	that	a	chapter	constructing	one	is	required	for	this	study.	
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3. Global vision. The discipline of World History
Any	consideration	of	the	discipline	of	world	history	must	start	with	this	question:	Is	world	
history important? Events of the past two decades would seem to indicate that it is. The 
founding	of	the	World	Historical	Association	in	1982	and	journals	dedicated	to	the	cause,	
starting with the Journal of World History in 1990, coincided with a steady growth in teaching 
world history. There has been, admittedly, somewhat of a regression of late, especially in 
American universities.1 However, with continued steady growth of the global history form 
of	world	history,	it	appears	to	not	be	just	a	flash-in-the-pan.	So,	what	exactly	constitutes	
world	history?	This	question	is	especially	pertinent	considering	the	varied	definitions	and	
terminologies world historians themselves assign to their endeavour. For a start, what is its 
relationship with both history and the world, its two constituent elements? If the answer 
were as simple as the history of the world, or at least the world known to those writers in 
earlier	periods	of	history,	there	would	be	little	conjecture	or	need	for	debate.	There	are	four	
pitfalls	to	this	explanation.	The	first	is	a	simple	matter	of	scale,	for	it	would	be	impossible	
for any world historian, or indeed teams of such, to write a history of everything that has 
ever happened, much to the chagrin of the likes of Leopold von Ranke.2 Such work would 
be unreadable due to its length not to mention its unfathomable minutiae. The second is the 
availability	of	that	knowledge,	for	it	is	impossible	for	every	event,	regardless	of	consequence,	
to have been recorded, or recorded with a consistency anywhere near necessary for study. 
These lead to another pitfall—a history of everything approach leaves behind all facts and no 
narrative, recording everything and telling nothing. It threatens to level everything out to a 
meaningless	parity,	where	no	event	has	significance	over	any	other,	which	despite	postmodern	
protestations to the contrary, is impossible. The fourth pitfall, in the words of Michael Geyer 
and Charles Bright, is that such an approach, 
misses the nature break that constitutes world history in a global age… World history 
in a global age proceeds differently. The recovery of the multiplicity of the world’s 
pasts matters now more than ever … because, in a global age, the world’s pasts are 
all simultaneously present, colliding, interacting, intermixing producing a collage of 
present histories that is surely not the history of a homogenous global civilisation.3 
In effect, the global age has revealed the complexities and heterogeneity of global civilisation, 
distinctions which would be missed in a history constructed without prioritisation or 
investigation into strands of difference. 
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This	chapter	will	endeavour	to	formulate	a	definition	of	world	history.	It	must	be	noted,	
however,	that	this	will	be	a	particular	author’s	definition.	Many	practicing	world	historians	
might	take	issue	with	some	of	its	elements.	However,	as	this	definition	will	be	constructed	
by reviewing the declarations of world history practitioners, some standing at the pinnacle 
of	the	field,	the	overall	conclusion	should	be	fairly	palatable,	especially	when	considering	the	
reticence	of	many	of	them	to	offer	comprehensive	definitions	of	their	own.	This	chapter,	
therefore, will build towards a constructed formulation for world history writing that will 
enable it to be related to The End of History and The Clash of Civilizations as well as geopolitical 
debates	of	global	significance.	
It	would	be	wise	to	first	consider	the	beliefs	of	William	McNeill,	recognised	by	many	in	the	
world history fraternity as the forefather of the discipline in its current form.4 McNeill states 
that, “histories of the portion of the earth known to the writer are properly classed as world 
histories	inasmuch	as	they	seek	to	record	the	whole	significant	and	knowable	past”. 5 There are 
two	very	important	qualifying	elements	that	stand	out	in	McNeill’s	comment.	The	first	is	“the	
earth	known	to	the	writer”	and	the	second	“significant”,	emphases	shared	by	Marnie	Hughes-
Warrington, who contended that “the ‘world’ in world history … refers not to the earth in its 
entirety—both including and apart from human experience—but to the known and meaning ful 
world of an individual or group”. 6 The scale beyond the town, state, and nation state is already 
clear	here,	as	well	as	a	search	for	the	significant—a	characteristic	shared	by	all	who	write	
world history. These distinctions mean that there is the potential to construct either a single 
or a number of meta-narratives but what purpose would be served? Marshall Hodgson sees 
these world history meta-narratives as setting “a framework to all our historical experience”,7 
in effect giving humanity a platform from which to consider their existence, a point again 
shared by Hughes-Warrington: “The purpose of world histories and creation myths is to 
construct a world of meaning and order that is not so much right or wrong as useful”. 8
The	construction	of	world	historical	narratives	should	liberate	patterns	and	sequences	from	
the morass of recorded history, much in the same way that the more philosophical universal 
histories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries aspired to achieve. Patrick Manning 
comments on patterns when stating that world history addresses, “patterns at a larger 
scale that may not be observable or explicable at more localised levels, and it addresses the 
linkages among localised and broader scales”.9	Another	significant	term	that	stands	out	here	
is “linkages”. Linkages are prominent throughout much of the discourse on world history, 
bringing to the fore its foundational element—people—which again broadens the scale, 
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without necessarily superseding many institutional or regional groupings which dominate 
traditional history writing. Jerry Bentley outlines simply the centrality of people to world 
history; stating that “‘interactions between peoples participating in large-scale historical 
processes’ are ‘one of the central concerns of world history’”. 10 Indeed, people are central 
to	a	definition	of	world	history	offered	by	Patrick	Manning,	who	boldly	opens	his	2003	
monograph Navigating World History with the statement, “To put it simply, world history is the 
story of connections within the human community”.11 People drive the interactions that form 
the cultures and civilisations to which they belong, and the change and growth in those units 
that results from external contact.
At the forefront here is McNeill, who has based his entire vanguard of world history writing 
upon “the reality and historical importance of trans-civilizational encounters”.12 Such 
patterns	and	linkages	would	obviously	take	on	a	global	significance	when	the	known	world	
is considered; in this age of modern globalisation that would entail the entire planet. C.A. 
Bayly	interprets	world	history	in	relation	to	globalisation,	in	a	definition	where	some	of	the	
aforementioned pieces come together, 
It	shows	how	historical	trends	and	sequences	of	events,	which	have	been	treated	
separately in regional or national histories, can be brought together. This reveals the 
interconnectedness and interdependence of political and social changes across the 
world well before the supposed onset of the contemporary phase of “globalization” 
after 1945.13
What	Bayly	is	stating	is	that	although	modern	globalisation	has	magnified	the	
interconnectedness and interdependence of political and social change across the world, this 
is not a new phenomenon. 
The review to this point of what practitioners have been saying about world history appears 
to	make	an	underlying	definition—without	having	analysed	its	methodological	framework—
fairly rudimentary. Unfortunately, there are two fundamentals that must be addressed before 
reviewing the methodology of world history, namely the confusing mass of terms and sub-
genres	that	are	used	to	define	world	history,	and	its	relationship	to	previous	endeavours	at	
writing world history that stretch back millennia.  
World	historians	are	notable	for	employing	a	multitude	of	often	confusing	self-defining	
terms, such as ‘global history’, ‘new global history’, ‘world systems history’, or ‘universal 
history’, to offer but four examples.14 This point bears closer inspection. Scholars seem to be 
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divided on whether these are one-and-the-same, related or completely different. This may 
explain	why	finding	a	common	world	history	definition	remains	for	the	most	part	elusive,	
and	why	the	single-term	definition	to	be	offered	in	this	chapter	might	raise	a	few	eyebrows.	
Patrick O’Brien, who coincidentally uses the term global, is essentially stating they are 
the same, with differences of scope and scale. He explains this well when considering the 
terms world, global and universal, “hairs may be split in dealing with possible ambiguities, 
the	confusion	of	conflation,	or	with	potentially	illuminating	distinctions	embodied	in	
all	three	adjectives”.15  Other world historians make a point of separating these terms 
into different genre positions, such as Bruce Mazlish. Although acknowledging their 
similarities,	Mazlish	defines	world	history	and	global	history	as	two	different	endeavours,	
noting	that,	“whereas	world	history	may	take	all	of	the	past	for	its	subject,	global	history	
restricts its attention to the theme of globalisation”.16 He sees global history as a means 
to	capture	a	vision	in	time	of	the	subject	part	of	the	earth	with	relation	to	globalisation,	
stating that “Global thus points in the direction of space; its sense permits the notion of 
standing outside our planet and seeing ‘Spaceship Earth’”.17 The confusion over terms 
might be logical; in the rush to legitimise a relatively new (or reborn) academic endeavour 
it	is	possible	that	justifying	importance	by	differentiation	and	qualities	of	uniqueness	have	
played	a	role	in	this.	Related	to	the	discourse	concerning	self-defining	terminology	are	
differences in opinion as to what belongs in world history and what doesn’t, and whether 
world history is actually a new endeavour that began with the likes of McNeill, Hodgson 
and	Leftos	Stavrinos	in	the	1950s	and	1960s,	or	an	evolution	of	past	attempts	to	find	
meaning through the history of the world, such as speculative philosophies of history.
Speculative philosophy of history is one of a number of terms used to describe a style of 
philosophical history that builds in most cases a single metanarrative of world history—
“History with a capital H”, in the words of Immanuel Wallerstein18—in order to uncover 
either a passage to the end point of a historical procession—the telos—or the existence of 
a cyclical pattern in world history. It shares with some world histories the unit of study—
generally though not exclusively the world, although this is a world whose parameters are 
determined by the writer. All peoples and cultures that contribute to or play a part in the 
narrative,	including	the	inactive	or	insignificant	‘others’, 	are	accounted	for	in	this	unit,	even	
if in the latter case this is by omission. The term universal history, common throughout 
Fukuyama’s The End of History, is probably the best known of the speculative philosophies of 
history. They also share with world history a desire to account for human progression and 
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the development of a historical narrative to a point in time. Where speculative philosophy 
of	history	differs	is	in	its	philosophical	underpinnings,	more	specifically	its	methodological	
foundation based upon determinism, teleology and a priori constructions, as well as the 
tendency of some speculative philosophies of history to offer constructed portends into the 
future course of history.
Speculative philosophy of history is not the focus of this work, although engagement with 
it is somewhat unavoidable because a convincing case can be made for both Fukuyama 
and Huntington being writers of both world history and speculative philosophy of history. 
It	is	sufficient	to	state	briefly	that	speculative	philosophy	of	history	became	discredited	
inexorably and progressively from the mid-nineteenth century, for various reasons including 
its aforementioned methodological foundation, connection to nationalism and totalitarianism, 
and stark eurocentric triumphalism. This helps explain why many who write world histories 
today pass over the connection, whilst others have taken a more realistic, and must be stated, 
world historical approach to the problem. McNeill—inspired by Arnold J. Toynbee—is 
one	who	acknowledges	the	connection,	gaining	inspiration	from	the	questions	posed	by	
speculative	philosophy	of	history	whilst	acknowledging	its	fundamental	flaws.19 Another is 
O’Brien, who dates what he terms global history writing to Herodotus (495-425BCE), making 
world history for him a modern, professional, and less philosophical and version of those 
previous endeavours.20 
Most world historians share a disdain for philosophical and eurocentric world histories of the 
past, a feeling best summed up by Michael Geyer and Charles Bright, who stated that the old 
style of world history “was an illegitimate, unprofessional, and therefore foolish enterprise. 
It was for dilettantes”.21 Regardless of the feelings concerning speculative philosophies 
of history within the world history fraternity, there is more than enough evidence to link 
speculative philosophies of history to current world history as an antecedent practice, an 
important point when considering what world history actually is. The world history writing 
of	today	may	be	different,	but	it	is	definitely	related.	This	is	important	when	relating	world	
history	to	issues	of	global	significance,	especially	as	the	writers	being	used	here	to	build	a	
bridge between world history and geopolitical debate are Fukuyama and Huntington.
If one were to accept O’Brien’s contention that the myriad terms outlining world history 
are	essentially—with	a	few	specific	variations—describing	one	and	the	same	practice,	and	
that world history has a pedigree stretching back almost 2,500 years, what distinguishes 
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the world histories of today from all others? In this area there is a modicum of agreement 
among world historians that there are two different streams of modern world history writing. 
One is based upon connexions, the other, on comparison.22	‘Connexion’	was	first	used	in	
history by McNeill as a descriptor for a methodology to which he remains adhered.23 In the 
words of the man himself: “It follows that world history ought to be constructed around 
this reality (connexions), the largest and most inclusive framework of human experience, 
and	the	lineal	ancestor	of	the	old	world	in	which	we	find	ourselves	so	confusingly	immersed	
today”. 24 Connexions describe the phenomenon where contacts between different units 
previously unbeknownst to each other have a lasting impact on both parties—in short, best 
summed up by a four word process: contact, connection, exchange and change. O’Brien adds 
that, “McNeill’s assumption is that ‘encounters’, ‘contacts’ and above all ‘connexions’ with 
‘outsiders’ can be represented as the origins and engine of most economic, social, political, 
military, cultural, religious, technological and other conceivable types of change studied by 
historians”. 25 This theme, according to David Christian, has “inspired an entire generation of 
scholarship in world history”,26 including his own. 
The second approach, as seen by O’Brien, “extends geographical catchment areas (from the 
local to the more encompassing units) for comparative histories of topics that might be the 
subject	of	a	study	across	parish,	regional	and	national	boundaries	as	well	as	continents,	oceans	
and separable cultures”.27 This is the comparative approach noted above, the origins of which 
Michael	Geyer	and	Charles	Bright	trace	to	the	quest	for	“the	history	of	discovery,	maritime	
empires, and nomadic formations …  It is a history of mobility and mobilization, or trade 
and merchants, of migrants and diasporas, or travellers and communication”.28 This approach 
is more commonly labelled global history, and although resting upon the moniker ‘global’, 
does not necessarily take in the entire world. However, this is based upon the same dynamic 
of contact, connection, exchange and change, sharing methodology and mindset, differing 
only from world history as highlighted previously by its scale and, in some cases, boundaries 
of study. It is these two streams that make up world history: world history by connexion; and 
world history by comparison.
World	history	differs	from	traditional	history	as	influenced	by	Ranke	in	that	it	has	returned	
to using generalisation as a synthesis tool, a practice more prevalent in world history writings 
of previous eras. Traditional historians do not necessarily understand or appreciate this 
development; in the words of Hughes-Warrington, “World histories … are considered 
derivative: they are viewed as an amalgam of smaller national histories and thus as dependent 
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on the historiographical presuppositions and methodologies of them”.29 It does, of course, 
require	history—of	this	there	is	no	debate.30 Beyond that, the penchant for generalisation 
is bound by two principles: scale and necessity of formulating a narrative. In addition, 
secondary sources are relied upon more than primary sources, although the latter remains 
indispensable.31	Marshall	Hodgson	summarises	this	well,	“Here	the	complexity	of	the	enquiry,	
the	breadth	of	the	questions	it	asks,	is	such	that	it	can	no	longer	be	a	question	of	marshalling	
all evidence bearing upon a single occasion, but of selecting and arranging all evidence 
bearing	on	the	wider	questions	at	issue”.32 Patrick O’Brien adds the spatial aspect to this, 
stating that “in order to emphasize and communicate major differences as well as resemblances 
global historians will tend to aggregate and average contrasts across more extended spaces and 
larger populations (continents, oceans, cultures and civilizations) than their colleagues who 
have	the	time	and	sources	to	engage	in	exercises	in	comparative	history	for	more	confined	
geographies and time scales”.33
World histories, regardless of whether their spatial dimension is the entire globe or the 
phenomenon	of	globalisation,	are	able	to	focus	on	a	subject	specific	core.	According	to	
O’Brien, it “has already generated a bibliography of global histories concerned with: economic 
development, gender, the family, youth, marriage, diet, housing, health, military organization, 
government, slavery, human rights, parliaments, nationalism, religions, fundamentalism, 
revolutions, and so forth”.34 As such, world history need not stand isolated from other 
disciplines; indeed to attempt to write such histories without employing other disciplines, due 
to	the	breadth	of	enquiry	required,	renders	this	task	difficult.35 In addition, it brings academic 
world history writing closer to works of amateur world history and also world historical works 
from academics specialising in other disciplines. The type and number of disciplines utilised 
varies according to the needs of the topic; with a broad scope, ranging from disciplines 
often employed by traditional historians, such as political science and international relations; 
through to newer cross-overs like biology and geology.36 
World historians, with their professional tool kit covering multiple disciplines, are able—if 
the	history	in	question	so	dictates—to	write	from	a	present	perspective.	The	manner	of	this	
differs considerably from traditional historians who wrote present-centred Whiggish histories 
to explain and solidify national triumph and superiority, none the least because they are 
not welded to the perspectives of a single nation state. In the words of Michael Geyer and 
Charles Bright, “Narrating world history in our global age means taking seriously (rather than 
fleeing	from)	the	present.	And	it	means	recovering	the	spirit	and	intent	of	historical	inquiry,	
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as practiced in archival research, and adapting this to the task of writing contemporary 
history”.37 The relation to world history and the nation is an interesting one. As world 
history can “help to uncover a variety of hidden meta-narratives”,38 many have argued that 
a	world	historical	approach	actually	enhances	and	makes	previously	confined	national	and	
regional spatial histories more thorough due to the placing of that unit in a global context.39 
It can reveal local and national differences, which enriches the histories of the locals or 
nations	in	question.40 Indeed, as Thomas Bender argues with respect to the U.S., “American 
history	cannot	be	adequately	understood	unless	it	is	incorporated	into	that	global	context”. 41 
He continues, “whatever the distinctive position of the United States today, it remains 
nonetheless only one global province interconnected with and interdependent with every 
other one. The history of the United States is but one history amongst histories”. 42 
Another	often	stated	quest	of	world	historians	is	to	transcend	and	invalidate	eurocentric,	
indeed all centric, viewpoints that were core features of both previous efforts at world history 
and nation state based traditional histories.43 World history should neither present a national 
perspective of the world nor ignore or downplay the contributions of cultures other than 
that of the writer to the relevant narrative, because, as Marnie Hughes-Warrington put it, 
“there is no single culture, method or purpose that has shaped the making of world history”. 44 
Geyer and Bright add that, “world history at the end of the twentieth century must therefore 
begin with new imaginings. It cannot continue to announce principles of universality, as 
if the process shaping the globe into a materially integrated totality have yet to happen”.45 
The nation state is still an important component part of world history, in a few cases the 
core unit of study, although it must be remembered that the modern nation state, and the 
political world in which we live, is a Western invention. Although Hodgson stated that, “to 
make use of current political boundaries in our discussion of historical materials turns out, 
with	remarkable	frequency,	to	be	another	means	of	reinforcing	Westernist	biases”, 46 it is 
impractical to remove the nation state from world history writing, as long as there are nation 
state elements involved in the lives of the people in the narrative. One of the Western biases 
is the principle of universality, which reinforces the “condescension of cultures”, 47 a point 
specifically	pertinent	to	Fukuyama.
There	is	an	interesting	side	conflict	in	play	here,	whether	world	history	writing	has	over-
corrected the centric mistakes of the past. Whilst it may be “important to consider the 
resources and strategies, and mutual collisions of dominant groups and their supporters, 
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at a world-historical level, as well as to chart the experience of people without history”,48  it 
should not do so at the expense of acknowledgement of the achievement of what has been 
historically termed ‘the West’. To remove this achievement from world history would threaten 
a return to the scenario posed at the beginning of this chapter—writing a history where 
everything	has	equal	significance.	Ricardo	Duchense	gives	a	good	warning	when	commenting	
on the backlash against Western civilisation prevalent in some world history writing; “it is 
an ideology that encourages all students to place the level of intellectual achievements of all 
cultures on the same moral and rational level, and discourages the so-called ‘triumphalist’ 
ideas	that	Western	civilisation	has	made	the	major	contributions	to	the	ideals	of	freedom,	
democracy and reason”.49 The danger in this is two fold: it removes prioritisation or 
segmentation from historical achievement, and it opens the door for a new centrist viewpoint 
taking the place of the old eurocentrism by stealth.
Having now reviewed what world history practitioners have been writing about their 
discipline,	it	is	now	time	to	attempt	a	definition,	or	a	set	of	defining	characteristics,	for	world	
history,	in	order	to	both	qualify	the	works	of	Fukuyama	and	Huntington	as	such,	and	also	
to support the contention that an understanding of world history is an important asset when 
considering	significant	global	debates,	such	as	those	in	the	geopolitical	arena.	
World	history	is	a	field	of	historical	study	encompassing	either	an	overall	view	of	
the	entire	world	known	to	the	writer	at	the	time,	or	a	subject	specific	view	of	that	
subject’s	world.	It	investigates	matters	of	global	significance—overcoming	the	
epistemological pitfall of scale by employing a degree of generalisation—in order to 
help establish a framework and useful meaning for world history from a non-centric 
point	of	view.	Although	founded	in	history,	it	utilises	other	disciplines	when	required.	
World histories are constructed by the examination of connexions, linkages, transfer 
and	diffusion	in	order	to	uncover	patterns	and	sequences	of	historical	change.		
As for the alternative terms used for world history, as noted above, the following can be added.
Variants	such	as	global	history—which	tend	to	subject	specificity	and	comparative	
foundations—are merely a different spatial manifestation of world history, often 
focussed upon globalisation, that apply the same overall principles, standards of 
professionalism, and search for desirable outcomes that stand up to academic scrutiny.
Now	that	we	have	a	definition	with	which	to	consider	world	history	when	relating	it	to	
geopolitical discourse, all that remains is to reinforce what world historians believe to be 
the	overall	benefits	of	their	endeavour.	Many	comments	outlined	here	seem	to	place	world	
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history writing as a vital endeavour in the service of the present, a point which bears 
remembering when the absence of world historians from the geopolitical debates of global 
significance	is	considered.	
Michael Geyer and Charles Bright offer a pointer as to what world history can achieve in the 
current global environment, 
It is precisely the rupture between the present condition of globality and its many 
possible pasts that gives the new world history its distinctive ground and poses the 
familiar	historical	questions,	which	do	not,	as	yet,	have	clear	answers:	when	and	
how was the history of our world, with its characteristic condition of accelerating 
integration and proliferating difference, torn off from the many histories of the 
world’s pasts and set upon its separate course?50
It	is	evident	here	that	many	of	the	questions	posed	by	Geyer	and	Bright	are	similar	to	those	
raised by writers of earlier attempts at world history. To both men, world history can reveal 
purpose	at	a	global	level	that	traditional	history	could	only	provide	for	confined	units,	leading	
them to proclaim that, “this should be an exhilarating moment for historians … to account 
for the world as it is”. 51
Similar thoughts are offered by O’Brien, who, apart from seeing an ability for global history 
to “broaden our education”, 52 believes it can help people “comprehend the environmental, 
human and cultural diversities of their times”, 53 whilst raising the “awareness of the 
lives, achievements and sufferings of humanity as a whole”.54 Hughes-Warrington, who 
acknowledges the connection of contemporary world history and its predecessors, agrees: 
“world histories, I believe, share the feature of being a construction of and thus a guide to 
a meaningful world”.55	Hodgson	claims	all	of	history	itself	is	“in	virtue	of	the	questions	it	
studies possessing a permanent public interest”,56 due to the fact that people’s, “image of the 
physical and temporal pattern of the human world as a whole, is fundamental to our sense of 
who we are. No one is without some image of the sort, however crude”.57 Paul Kennedy, in 
referring to David Landes, states that Landes was right: there will always be a place for world 
history	writings,	as	they	fulfill	a	basic	human	instinct	to	impose	some	order	on	the	past.58 
This can be applied from above when constructing national histories, as per the examples 
given by Thomas Bender, who writes that if that image can “imbue our national history and 
civic discourse with appropriate humility, accepting the country’s condition of being one 
among many in an interdependent world”.59 These comments indicate that world history, by 
uncovering some order on the past, creates some order for the present.
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McNeill	projects	this	belief	onto	the	future	wellbeing	of	human	society.	He	states	that,	
“historians can play a modest but useful part in facilitating a tolerable future for humanity 
as a whole and for all its different parts”.60 World historians have been for the most part 
reticent to offer “considerations of the future”, a hold over from speculative philosophies 
of history, as they “disdainfully view such attempts as amateurish and even embarrassing”.61 
Craig	Benjamin	contends	ruefully	that	this	“seems	extraordinary	given	that	there	is	actually	a	
great deal we can say about the future with a fair degree of certainty”.62 Part of the tolerable 
future	is	a	world	with	less	conflict	and	aggression,	actions	that	are	connected	to,	if	not	
dictated	by,	geopolitical	debates	of	global	significance.	As	with	all	written	study,	the	effect	
of world history is directly related to how it is received, by whom, and what expectations are 
placed on them, which leads Hughes-Warrington to comment, “exploring what is expected 
of world histories, when, and by whom, may help to cast critical light on contemporary 
geopolitical discourses such as that on the health and clash of civilisations”.63 Jerry Bentley 
adds that, “to the extent that visions of world history shape the values of voters and policy 
makers,	the	stakes	include	intellectual	influence	with	potentially	enormous	implications	for	
global governance, peace and security—or lack therefore”. 64  Which is where we now turn. To 
geopolitical discourses with implications for global governance, peace and security, to look at 
a particular bridge between world history and geopolitical discourse, The End of History and the 
Last Man by Francis Fukuyama and The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order 
by Samuel Huntington.
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4.  A clash of civilisations or the end of history? 
Samuel Huntington and Francis Fukuyama
Now	that	we	have	established	a	constructed	definition	of	world	history,	supported	by	
commentary of its practitioners, we are now able to look at two works with world historical 
foundations that could effectively build a bridge between world history and geopolitical 
debate.	The	first	book	appeared	in	1992—Francis	Fukuyama’s	The End of History and the 
Last Man. Fukuyama, a political economist and philosopher who wrote his thesis on Soviet 
foreign policy in the Middle East, had worked in policy planning for the Reagan era State 
Department,	under	Paul	Wolfowitz,	a	very	important	player	in	the	debates	in	question.1 At 
the time of writing he was a full-time employee of the conservative think tank, the Rand 
Corporation.2 The End of History, a follow up to an article penned for The National Interest in 
1989, was Fukuyama’s attempt to map out future development of global politics and society. 
It	was	based	upon	one	very	simple	premise—the	failure	of	totalitarianism	as	exemplified	by	
the Communist ‘second world’ and previous twentieth-century socio-political movements 
such as fascism and nazism, left only one socio-political system as a viable alternative—liberal 
democracy, which for him represented the end point of the historical progress of humanity—
its telos—as only liberal democracy could guarantee human freedom.
This relatively simple claim is overwhelmed, however, by the means by which Fukuyama reaches 
this synthesis. It is the make-up and foundation of his argument for which Fukuyama became at 
once so criticised and so successful. Fukuyama approached proving his thesis from two angles, 
based upon selective world historical constructions and the writings of historical philosophy. The 
first	is	what	he	calls	the	“mechanism	of	desire”.3  This mechanism supports a mostly economic 
argument, based upon the power of liberal democracy and the economic system that underpins 
it, modern capitalism, to satisfy man’s desires. Liberal democracy is the natural outcome of full 
economic modernity, and capitalism is the only viable path toward that modernity,4 as proven by 
the disintegration of historical competition to modern capitalist systems.
This mechanism is driven by the irresistible progress of technological development, the 
economic and material outcome of what he terms modern natural science. Fukuyama states 
that he “selected modern natural science as a possible underlying ‘mechanism’ of directional 
historical change, because it is the only large-scale social activity that is by consensus 
cumulative and therefore directional”.5 The evolution of modern natural science has been 
powered	by	two	fundamental	human	requirements;	the	need	to	fight	wars	to	satisfy	material	
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needs (including labour), which he calls military competition,6 which when ultimately successful 
leads to technology being utilised to greater effect to satisfy human consumption desires, or 
material wants.7 This is the modernisation that Fukuyama contends is in every person’s sights. 
The eventual political, economic and material homogenisation of humankind will render all 
humans	both	equal	and	satisfied,	therefore	helping	eliminate	the	need	to	resort	to	conflict.	The	
only true environment in which such a process can be realised is liberal democracy.
There	is	one	facet	of	desire	that	Fukuyama	states	is	unable	to	be	satisfied	by	this	
mechanism—that of recognition.8 The mechanism of desire may explain why liberal 
democracy will end up as the only viable system, but not why it must be the only natural 
system. In addition, the mechanism of desire only accounts “for the last four hundred years or 
so of human history”;9 therefore rendering progress up to that point unexplainable. In order 
to complete his thesis, Fukuyama introduces the “mechanism of recognition”.10 This part of 
his argument is purely philosophical, and it is here that his interpretations of past treatises of 
speculative philosophy of history come to the fore. Although he evokes and utilises a wide 
range of thinkers—notably all from classical Euro-American schools of philosophy11—his 
core	argument	is	based	almost	entirely	on	Franco-Russian	philosopher	Alexandre	Kojève’s	
interpretation	of	German	philosopher	Georg	W.	F.	Hegel.	“Hegel-	Kojève”12 provides the 
missing link, enabling Fukuyama to create a monocausal metanarrative spanning from ‘the 
first	man’	to	‘the	last	man’.	Hegel’s	universal	history	is	far	too	elaborate	to	outline	in	great	
detail here, however like Fukuyama it is centred upon the realisation of recognition and 
freedom.13 In the words of Hegel, “Universal history is exclusively occupied with showing how 
Spirit comes to a recognition and adoption of the truth: the dawn of knowledge appears; it 
begins to discover salient principles, and at last it arrives at full consciousness”.14
This need for recognition can be traced to Hegel’s original and foundational dialectic of 
man,	whereby	‘the	first	men’s’	fear	of	death	determined	the	dualist	order	of	humanity	that	
remained unchallenged for millennia. The man willing to forgo natural survival instincts 
and challenge death would become the master, the man unwilling to risk death the slave.15 
The slaves slow struggle for recognition as a human being was driven by the need to satisfy, 
from Plato’s term, a thymos—in essence, the inner spirit.16 Man’s thymos sought isothymia, “the 
desire	to	be	recognised	as	the	equal	of	other	people”, 17 in opposition to the megalothymia of the 
master. Megalothymia is described by Fukuyama as “manifest both in the tyrant who invades 
and enslaves a neighbouring people so that they will recognize his authority, as well as in 
the concert pianist who wants to be recognized as the foremost interpreter of Beethoven”.18 
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Fukuyama sees in liberal democracy a controlled, sanitised version of megalothymia, in such 
fields	as	sport,	the	arts	and	business,	in	which	is	it	acceptable	to	a	degree	so	long	as	it	plays	
a part in satisfying one’s thymos.19 There is danger in this form of megalothymia ; the Nazis for 
example used it to great effect to satisfy the isothymia of	its	racially	German	subjects.	
According	to	Kojève’s	interpretation	of	Hegel,	this	freedom	was	first	manifest	in	the	
American and French revolutions and reached its apex—its telos—after the conclusion of 
the Battle of Jena in 1806, when Napoleon’s forces routed the King of Prussia,20 an event 
that proved a stimulus for reforms that ended the feudal era in Prussia. This brings up an 
interesting and often debated point about Fukuyama’s epistemology. The ‘end of history’ 
does not indicate the end of historical events, per se, nor that there can’t be deviations from 
the monocausal line of historical progress, but the satisfaction of the telos. His mechanism of 
desire and the mechanism of recognition converge at the end of history, leaving humanity 
free and recognised as such, when the satisfaction of desire through liberal democracy and its 
catalyst, modern capitalism, intersects with the political and therefore individual freedom of 
the spirit manifest in liberal democratic political systems.
Fukuyama employs an empirical approach with the mechanism of desire, formulating a world 
historical narrative arguing that governments have become more democratic over time, 
proven by the weakness of dictatorships, as he shows in two hundred plus years of recorded 
history leading up to the writing of the book.21 The mechanism of recognition, by contrast, 
is entirely philosophical, leaning heavily on universal history. Fukuyama concludes that 
the homogeneity of the human race is a bi-product of these mechanisms being determined 
by the political system that guarantees freedom.22 In his own words, “The universal and 
homogenous state that appears at the end of history can thus be seen as resting on the 
twin pillars of economics and recognition”. 23 As with all large monocausal philosophies of 
history, Fukuyama’s process can be used in reverse to explain many contributing historical 
phenomena, such as imperialism and nationalism.24 
Fukuyama does not claim the end of history has been reached, rather that the conditions for 
it were locked into place by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. After this event, it would 
become	inevitable.	When	the	end	of	history	is	finally	reached,	it	is	a	rather	dispassionate	
existence for Fukuyama. Here he invokes Friedrich Nietzsche and his “Men without Chests”,25 
not certain that the removal of struggle for both political recognition and material gain 
will result in eternal happiness. It is a somewhat miserable existence, as expressed by Roger 
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Kimball, “the satisfactions of living at the end of history will leave mankind so dull and 
complacent	that	his	spiritual	life	will	atrophy	and	he	will	find	himself	transformed	into	that	
flaccid	creature,	Nietzsche’s	‘last	man’”. 26 
Four years after the End of History and the Last Man came American political scientist Samuel 
Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order. Huntington has been, 
excepting a few years, a member of the Harvard Department of Government since 1950, 
where he was a teacher of Fukuyama.27 He too, worked in government, as Co-ordinator of 
Security Planning for the Carter-era National Security council.28 The Clash of Civilizations is 
much	less	identifiable,	on	first	glance,	as	either	a	world	history	or	speculative	philosophy	of	
history than The End of History. Huntington’s work is another attempt to outline a vision of 
the world’s future in the wake of the end of the Cold War, an uncertain time in geopolitics 
that Huntington calls “bloomin’ buzzin’ confusion”. 29 Huntington’s work is far less openly 
philosophical than Fukuyama’s, and regardless of his emphasis on the term ‘civilisations’, 
resembles more a standard geopolitical balance of power study, one where civilisations act 
like and are treated as larger versions of traditional nation states.  
Huntington’s thesis can be summed up as follows: The world is divided into units called 
civilisations as it has been throughout recorded world history. Currently, there are seven, 
possibly	eight	major	civilisations,	and	as	they	are	homogenous	entities	with	unique	cultural	
identities	and	differing	expectations	and	desires,	they	are	always	prone	to	conflict	with	one	
another.30 Civilisations determine the path of geopolitical relations and will continue to do 
so in the future. He states that “the central theme of this book is that culture and cultural 
identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of 
cohesion,	disintegration,	and	conflict	in	the	post	Cold-War	world”. 31	He	identifies	the	sources	
of	intercivilisational	conflict	either	along	their	boundaries,	or	fault	lines,	as	he	calls	them,	or	
driven by core state antagonism. He sees this threat as rising in the modern world due to a 
combination of reasons. The fall of the Soviet Empire left the world without an established 
and settled system of international relations, which had in the past been a safeguard of sorts 
against the fact that the most important and powerful countries are almost always from, and 
representative of, different civilisations.32 He hopes intercivilisational war can be averted by 
the formation of a new international order based upon civilisations, which accept each other’s 
differences and learn to stay apart, although he does not appear overly hopeful this will 
occur.33 In short, Huntington replaces the redundant superpower rivalry with an order centred 
upon “a clash of civilizations”.34  
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Huntington	defines	civilisations	together	with	culture;	they	are	different	scales	of	the	same	
entity,	and	are	ubiquitous.	He	states	that,	“civilizations	and	culture	both	refer	to	the	overall	
way of life of a people, and a civilization is a culture writ large”.35 Further to this, Huntington 
adds that civilisations are imprecise and malleable, contending that, “civilizations have no 
clear-cut	boundaries	and	no	precise	beginnings	and	endings.	People	can	and	do	redefine	their	
identities and, as a result, the composition and shapes of civilizations change over time”.36 He 
believes people seek identity, although not necessarily their primary identity, through their 
respective civilisations,37	which	is	why	fault	line	conflict	can	turn	intercivilisational,	as	he	
concludes that this bond is strong enough that countries will come to the aid of their cultural 
kin	in	the	event	that	they	are	threatened	by	such	a	conflict.38 The central civilisations in this 
new world order are: the ‘western’, representing North America, most of Europe, partially 
Latin America, possibly Israel and the settler colonies of Australia and New Zealand; the 
‘Sinic’, consisting of China, the Chinese Diaspora and related countries such as the Koreas, 
and ‘Islamic’, which represents to differing degrees all Islamic countries.39
Huntington fears that the relative power of the western civilisation is in decline,40 leaving an 
iron curtain of sorts, with the peoples of Western Christianity on one side, and Muslim and 
Orthodox peoples on the other.41 The multipolar and multicivilisational order left in the wake 
of the Cold War also renders the possibilities of a universal modernisation (á la Fukuyama) 
impossible; this can be seen in the shifting global balance of power. Huntington adds that the 
pretensions	of	the	west	in	imposing	their	universal	world	order	will	likely	backfire.42 The only 
way	to	stop	this	is	by	“Americans	reaffirming	their	Western	identity	and	Westerners	accepting	
their	civilization	as	unique	not	universal	…	Avoidance	of	a	global	war	of	civilizations	depends	
on world leaders accepting and cooperating to maintain the (new) multicivilizational character 
of global politics”. 43 To this point, Huntington outlines a model,
so as to be able to: 1. order and generalize about reality; 2. understand causal 
relationships among phenomena; 3. anticipate and, if we are lucky, predict future 
developments; 4. distinguish what is important from what is unimportant; (and) 
5. show us what paths we should take in order to achieve our goals.44 
There are only two true possible outcomes to Huntington’s thesis, global peace or global war, 
and these outcomes are path dependent.
The most notable difference between the two works is that Fukuyama’s is entirely based 
on a universalist assumption; that an end of history is achievable through the adoption of 
a	universal	liberal	democracy	movement	which	satisfies	the	need	for	human	recognition;	
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whereas The Clash of Civilizations,	by	basing	itself	on	the	uniqueness	of	civilisations,	offers	a	
complete repudiation of such internationalist tendencies, on the surface at least. He states, 
“the one harmonious world paradigm is clearly too far divorced from reality to be a useful 
guide to the post-Cold War world”, because it is clear in the time since the fall of the Soviet 
Empire that such harmony was non-existent.45 Fukuyama counters in a 2003 article that there 
is no such thing as a united Europe let alone a Western civilisation.46 With a universal focus, 
Huntington’s thesis would be untenable, without one, Fukuyama’s would suffer the same fate. 
Huntington in particular is vocal about this difference; however, it is arguable that the way in 
which he constructs civilisations is in itself universalist—as he uses the western social science 
model for identifying and categorising civilisations and imposes it globally.47 It is clear that 
at ‘the end of history’ Fukuyama sees ‘one world’, whereas Huntington uses world history to 
try to prove that there can only be ‘multiple worlds’. The other differences of note concern 
epistemology, particularly noticeable in Fukuyama’s mechanism of recognition. Huntington’s 
vision is also discernibly more sceptical than Fukuyama’s.  
As for similarities, both seem to be stressing Western values as superior (although, in 
Huntington’s case, excepting the imposition of those values on non-Western cultures) and the 
peaceful nature of relations between liberal democracies. Both are based on a political view 
specific	to	the	time	and	spatial	dimension	of	their	argument,	but	take	this	present	centred	
foundation	and	project	it	into	the	future.	Both	also	use	world	history	as	a	platform	from	
which to dive into their respective theses. The epistemological similarities between the two 
works	help	to	qualify	them	as	speculative	philosophies	of	history,	although	this	is	much	more	
obvious in Fukuyama’s work, which is essentially a universal history. For example, both works 
produce visions of the future contingent on their particular reading of the world historical 
record. With Fukuyama this is clear, whilst Huntington uses history to construct civilisations 
and	to	outline	their	past	and	future	growth	and	development.	They	share	not	just	historical	
pattern, a staple of modern world history study, but also motion. Whereas Fukuyama’s 
theory is monocausal, Huntington’s is path dependent, meaning that the future can unfold 
in two ways, dependent on the decisions of individuals and nation states. The End of History is 
inherently world historical and philosophical, The Clash of Civilizations, with its path dependent 
passage	to	the	future,	can	qualify	as	this	as	well.	
Huntington can be connected to the twentieth century cyclical philosophers of history 
such as Oswald Spengler, with whom he displays more comfort than most academics in 
claiming that his Decline of the West “has been a central theme in twentieth-century history”, 48 
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and	Arnold	J.	Toynbee,	who	is	partly	responsible	for	his	definition	of	civilisations	as	well	as	
the state of a civilisation at its end point of decline, which is arguably its telos.49 Huntington 
states that, “as the civilization’s universal state emerges, its peoples become blinded by 
what	Toynbee	called	‘the	mirage	of	immorality’	and	convinced	that	theirs	is	the	final	form	
of human society”.50 He differs on the repetitive cycle of universal history proposed by 
Toynbee and Spengler, although he does not discount it; here he is more in line with the less 
philosophical approach of William McNeill.51
This review of the theses of Fukuyama and Huntington shows their works to be motivated 
by politics; in Fukuyama’s case a political philosophy, and in Huntington’s case international 
relations. However, their entire treatises rest upon a construction and vision of world 
history,	which	corresponds	with	the	definition	of	world	history	outlined	in	the	previous	
chapter.	It	is	important	to	qualify	this	further,	which	is	the	subject	of	the	next	chapter.	
Once Fukuyama and Huntington are established as employers of world history, even if, 
in the case of Huntington, it was never his primary intention to write a world history, an 
analysis of geopolitical debates covering the same arena—the entire globe—which they 
are hypothesising about, will further bridge the gap between world history and geopolitical 
debates	of	global	significance.
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5.  New era. New world. Fukuyama, Huntington 
and World History
In order to establish the world historical credentials of Fukuyama and Huntington, it is 
necessary	to	return	to	our	core	definition	of	world	history	established	previously.
World	history	is	a	field	of	historical	study	encompassing	either	an	overall	view	of	
the	entire	world	known	to	the	writer	at	the	time,	or	a	subject	specific	view	of	that	
subject’s	world.	It	investigates	matters	of	global	significance—overcoming	the	
epistemological pitfall of scale by employing a degree of generalisation—in order to 
help establish a framework and useful meaning for world history from a non-centric 
point	of	view.	Although	founded	in	history,	it	utilises	other	disciplines	when	required.	
World histories are constructed by the studying of connexions, linkages, transfer and 
diffusion	in	order	to	uncovering	patterns	and	sequences	of	historical	change.		
This needs to be broken down into to its constituent elements to enable us to establish 
whether The End of History and The Clash of Civilizations are world histories, or are reliant on 
world history in order to make their arguments viable.
The	first,	and	most	important	component,	is	that	world	history	is	a	historical	study.	Both	 
The End of History and The Clash of Civilizations are not presented as histories, although 
Fukuyama writes a universal history, an antecedent form of world history. However, both 
treatises are reliant upon a world historical base, without which they would be untenable. 
For example, Fukuyama’s thesis is dependent on his world historical construction of the 
causes of the failure of non-liberal democratic modes of governance, the causal phenomenon 
leading to the eventual universal uptake of liberal democracy, which in turn results in 
complete human recognition. To achieve this he analyses the slow death of the Soviet 
system—a historical narrative of weakness—and compares this to similar weaknesses in 
totalitarian dictatorships such as Nazi Germany, military dictatorships such as Greece and 
Argentina and the apartheid regime in South Africa.1 The comparative element here is a 
feature of modern world history writing. From this synthesis, Fukuyama attributes the failure 
of all non-liberal democratic systems to a loss of legitimacy, something liberal democracy 
ably provides humanity. He supports this with a controversial table outlining the historical 
progression of democracy since the eighteenth century; contentious because of both the 
specific	years	selected	to	make	the	comparison,	and	his	bundling	together	of	all	democratic	
regimes	as	being	equally	capable	of	providing	freedom	as	the	form	of	liberal	democracy	
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he based his work upon.2 Further examples used by Fukuyama include his linking through 
historical narrative the development of education and industrialisation to the inevitability 
of democracy.3
Huntington’s thesis is also reliant upon a historical base. Like Fukuyama, he offers a political 
map of the contemporary world with a historical narrative describing how it got to that point.4 
His concept, as well as segmentation, of civilisations, is produced in the same manner, as are 
his arguments refuting competing world order theses, including the ‘one world’ paradigm 
of The End of History. Two examples where Huntington employs historical study in The Clash 
of Civilizations are how he establishes of the types of civilisations and nature of relations 
among and within them,5 and how he charts the rise, dominance and decline of Western 
civilisation. Without history here, Huntington has no thesis, as his civilisational paradigm 
would be rendered moot. Huntington also uses a world history construction to ascertain 
that the West has a problem with Islam, and has had so for over a thousand years, in turn 
using this to contradict the politically expedient line (at the time paraded by Bill Clinton and 
Francis Fukuyama, among others) that the only problem the West has with Islam is Islamic 
extremists.6 He constructs a history beginning in the early seventh century CE with the 
Islamic expansion, and taking in the crusades, and the Ottoman expansion into Europe.7 
Here he cites Bernard Lewis, historian of the Middle East from whom he borrowed the term 
“clash of civilizations”, 8 and a close personal friend and advisor to Dick Cheney, another 
influential	actor	in	the	debates.	He	frames	this	conflict	as	a	dichotomy,	sweeping	throughout	
the centuries on ‘the product of difference’ and yet fuelled by their similarities. Another 
area where he uses world history is to build up a ‘west versus the rest’ paradigm, through 
summarising how the rest of the world dealt with the West and modernisation, leading to his 
formulation	of	the	categories	of	rejectionism,	based	upon	Japan	from	the	16th-19th	century	
and China in the 17th and 18th centuries,9 Kemalism, and Reformism, citing among many 
instances the later stages of the Chinese Ch’ing dynasty and the failed modernisation efforts 
of Muhammad Ali in 1830s Egypt.10
Establishing	Fukuyama	and	Huntington’s	qualifications	as	employers	of	world	history	against	
the	other	constituent	elements	of	our	definition	is	relatively	straightforward.	Both	works	
purport to offer a view of the entire world, even though they make reference to world regions 
peripheral to their main theses only in passing. In Huntington’s case in particular, it seems 
enough to establish certain civilisations, such as the African and Latin American, and then 
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jettison	them	for	the	remainder	of	his	work.	However,	it	is	his	opinion	that	they	still	belong	
to his world order paradigm, as either peripheral contributors or as not in a position to have 
direct relevance to his overall thesis. Indeed, in the Latin American example it could be 
argued that its absence from The Clash of Civilizations is merely an accident of geography, for it 
has no true fault lines, no true dominant core state, and its civilisational barriers are oceans. 
In the case of The End of History, the tide of liberal democracy means that all regions will share 
the same form of governance, making his incomplete view of the world merely an indicator 
that the end of history has not yet been reached. It is also clear that both works concern 
matters	of	global	significance;	indeed	it	would	be	impossible	to	believe	that	the	writers	weren’t	
considering this when putting together their treatises. For Fukuyama, this is the current and 
future history of humanity, and a vision of a future world order of liberal democracy and a 
victory of the thymos. Huntington’s work is a study of the current and future world orders 
where path dependency will ensure the conditions for global war or worldwide peace. 
As for methodology, both works employ a great deal of generalisation to form world 
historical syntheses; unfortunately, some of their generalisations appear to veer somewhat 
into the realm of convenience. The most striking example is the civilisational paradigm 
of Huntington, formulated by combining a world historical viewpoint of elements such 
as language and religion, as well as economics, politics and a good deal of statistics. For 
example, by using statistics of religious adherents in the twentieth century that showed a 
dramatic growth in Islam and combining this with demographic data and Islam’s penchant 
for growth by conversion, he concludes that Islam will supersede Christianity as the most 
predominant	religion	in	the	world	in	the	early	twenty-first	century.11 In formulating his 
civilisational paradigm, Huntington has considered and then utilised the needed components 
to formulate an argument, with a degree of generalisation consistent with world history 
writing.  He segments the seven (possibly eight) civilisations by placing countries with others 
that he considers share a common culture.12 He states that “a civilization is thus the highest 
cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of 
what distinguishes humans from other species”.13	Yet,	in	doing	so,	he	makes	value	judgements,	
such as that the Vietnamese or Korean cultures identify with the Sinic civilisation, and the 
Greek and Russian with the Orthodox.14 The same can be said for Fukuyama. It is bold yet 
hazardous for Fukuyama to make all liberal democracy one and the same, both throughout 
history and into the future in order to form a single position for his main argument, whilst 
qualifying	that	there	are	great	differences	between	them,	such	as	the	Reagan/Thatcher	free	
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market model through to social democracies such those in Scandinavia.15 At the same time, 
Fukuyama devotes little space explaining the failings of the Soviet Union or other non-
democratic entities in history. In essence the progression of competing political philosophies 
whose failure enabled the triumph of liberal democracy are generalised to provide a 
contrasting ‘other’. It is arguable that the failings of these systems are far more complex than 
Fukuyama makes out.
Both The End of History and The Clash of Civilizations offer a framework and meaning for 
and of history. In Fukuyama’s more philosophical case, all of history, indeed all of human 
existence, has meaning because it is the driver of the process towards the telos—freedom. 
For Huntington, establishing a meaning of or for history is less clear, although if one was 
to look at his thesis in reverse it becomes clear that civilizations have always framed world 
history, and vice versa. In contemporary and future times, Huntington’s civilisational model, 
as determined by world history, determines whether civilisations can coexist peacefully as 
homogenous units, or succumb to a clash of civilisations, in effect determining world history. 
This is directly related to whether these two works uncover patterns of change. Fukuyama’s is 
entirely based upon a pattern of change, a single monocausal metanarrative determining the 
progress of humankind towards a liberal democratic utopia of freedom; world history in an 
albeit philosophical fashion. Huntington discovers a cyclical pattern of historical change, with 
the previous cycle being the ‘Cold War model’ and the current civilisational paradigm that 
will run its course and evolve into something new at an indeterminate point in the future.16
There are differing degrees of connexions, linkages, transfer and diffusion apparent in both 
works. Fukuyama’s thesis is that liberal democracy has and will continue to diffuse from 
the West outwards, through linkages; this movement is for the most part a one-way street. 
Thus his world history is not supported by connexions, as there is little evidence presented 
that	the	Western	model	of	liberal	democracy	is	evolving	due	to	both	internal	influences	and	
those from outside the West. However, the model of liberal democracy itself is the product 
of transfer and diffusion, albeit in that same limited geographical and cultural sphere—the 
West. Fukuyama’s contention (well supported by the historical record) that the American 
Founding Fathers took many of their ideas from Hobbes and Locke, as well as how the likes 
of	Fergusson,	Hume	and	Montesquieu	influenced	the	development	of	the	democratic	ideals	
on which liberal democracy rests, is a perfect example of this.17
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Huntington’s thesis, by parading the homogeneity of its civilisations, appears an anathema 
to the characteristics noted above.  However, he outlines that threats to Western civilisation 
have developed due to how non-Western cultures have added to or enhanced their own 
civilisations, and/or appropriated the necessary means, to compete, for example on world 
markets, through military build up, or even through terror, without becoming westernised.18 
Such responses by countries around the world, to the growth in power of the West, offer 
an example of linkages and diffusion. In Huntington’s words, “the expansion of the west 
has promoted both the modernisation and the Westernisation of non-western societies. The 
political and intellectual leaders of these societies have responded to the western impact 
in	one	or	more	of	three	ways:	rejecting	both	modernisation	and	Westernistion;	embracing	
both;	embracing	the	first	and	rejecting	the	second”.19 It is Huntington’s contention from 
review of the world historical record that, “in the early phases of change, Westernization thus 
promotes modernization. In the later phases, modernization promotes de-Westernization 
and the resurgence of indigenous culture”. 20 Huntington details this as a pragmatic response 
to modernisation that differs in its manner from civilisation to civilisation.21 This too is an 
example of linkage and diffusion, again a mostly one-way street. Look deeper, however, and 
his core state/periphery state paradigm is underlined by evidence of connexions and transfer, 
best	exemplified	by	the	East	Asian	cultural	framework	and	its	centrality	with	Confucianism.22
Both The End of History and The Clash of Civilizations are multidisciplinary works, based 
primarily in political science and economics. In addition Fukuyama’s work utilises political 
and historical philosophy, whereas Huntington’s is naturally focussed on international 
relations. It is also arguable that both rely on sociology by stealth; Fukuyama through theory 
and Huntington by his use of cultures. There is one area, however, where these books fall 
out	of	the	definition	outlined	here	for	world	history—and	that	is	the	goal	of	presenting	a	
non-centric perspective. They are clearly written from a Western perspective. Fukuyama’s 
employment of the universal value of liberal democracy—and his belief that the rest of 
the world will share his viewpoint—is eurocentric, indeed, amerocentric.23 Huntington’s 
underlying theme of the protection of Western civilisation, not to mention some backwater 
opinions about the Islamic civilisation in particular,24 also renders his work eurocentric. It is 
in this area alone that these two books seem to fail the test of world history. Yet, as previously 
defined,	the	removal	of	centrism	is	an	ideal.	The	challenge	for	world	historians	is	to	keep	
this to a minimum, and to acknowledge it—here it is clear both writers are not shying away 
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from it. The End of History and The Clash of Civilizations are works completely dependent on 
world history, and apart from displaying unabashed euro-amerocentrism, and perhaps in 
Fukuyama’s case an over-reliance on philosophy, they belong in the corpus of world history 
writing.	Now	it	is	time	to	turn	to	a	geopolitical	debate	of	global	significance,	a	living	and	
breathing example with implications for the entire globe, where an understanding of world 
history should enable a better understanding of their dynamics. A debate sharing the same 
global, spatial dimension as The End of History and The Clash of Civilizations—the American 
debates concerning the role of the U.S. in relation to the UN in the post-Cold War world.
4
6.  Is this town big enough for the two of us? 
American debates concerning the role of the UN
Having	now	established	a	workable	definition	of	world	history,	reviewed	the	magnum	
opuses	of	Francis	Fukuyama	and	Samuel	Huntington,	and	confirmed	that	both	are	founded	
upon world historical constructions, as well as a universal history and a geopolitical model 
respectively, it is time to examine an illustrative case study of a contemporary geopolitical 
debate.	The	robust	debate	in	question	is	ostensibly	a	domestic	American	endeavour.	What	
role should the UN play in relation to the U.S. in the ever shrinking post-Cold War world, 
a	living	and	breathing	discourse	with	immense	significance	to	the	entire	globe?	At	times	of	
international uncertainty, debates concerning both America’s rightful place in the world and 
the	design	and	purpose	of	the	modern	multilateral	global	system	increase	in	frequency	and	
intensity. They are fuelled by an enormous reservoir of American politicians and pundits 
who	by	nature	stake	their	position	on	any	issue	with	significance	to	the	U.S.,	not	to	mention	
political science and international law academics who would be in dereliction of their 
profession if they remained aloof.
Debates concerning the role of the UN, whilst simmering since it’s foundation in 1945, 
intensified	with	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	and	went	into	overdrive	during	the	machinations	
that	led	to	the	U.S.	invasion	of	Iraq	in	March	2003.	Within	these	debates,	numerous	opinions	
on that role have been espoused across the American political spectrum, some sympathetic 
to the UN, some brutal in its condemnation. Although there are two general positions 
within these debates, distilled from the four sides of overall debates on U.S. foreign policy, a 
single consistent attitude toward the UN can be ascertained—that the UN as a multilateral 
institution	should	be	working	towards,	or	being	used	to	further	the	foreign	policy	objectives	
of the U.S.—an attitude that shows a degree of disconnect with the actual foundational 
philosophy of the UN.  
The	UN	came	into	existence	in	1945,	during	the	final	stages	of	the	Second	World	War.	
American President, Franklin D. Roosevelt was a driving force behind the formation of an 
international order of nations that would right the wrongs of the previous experiment in 
global multilateral order, the League of Nations. The UN was designed as a great- power 
driven world system; to ensure such a catastrophe as the Second World War would never be 
repeated,1 whilst ensuring the reintegration of “the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered 
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Allied	states	into	a	unified	international	system”. 2 The most powerful illustration of the 
inspiration behind the UN is to be found at the very introduction to the Charter of the 
United Nations,
We the peoples of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations 
from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow 
to	mankind,	and	to	reaffirm	faith	in	fundamental	human	rights,	in	the	dignity 
and	worth	of	the	human	person,	in	the	equal	rights	of	men	and	women	and	of	
nations	large	and	small,	and	to	establish	conditions	under	which	justice	and	respect	
for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law 
can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in 
larger freedom.3
The great power signatories to the UN Charter believed that they needed to manage the 
new	international	system	on	behalf	of	the	world,	and	that	as	long	as	they	could	avoid	conflict	
amongst	themselves—which	was	perceived	as	the	major	threat	on	a	global	scale—peace	
and security could be protected.4 Hence the UN Security Council (UNSC) veto provisions, 
without which, it is likely the entire concept would have been stillborn.5 It was never the 
intention	that	the	UN	would	be	for	the	“benefit	of	the	weak,	but	rather	to	avoid	the	strong	
stepping on each other’s toes”, 6 in effect to head off the threat of world war. The UN was 
a prime example of Realpolitik, a practical attempt to ensure great powers never clashed 
again, whilst ensuring that they could act outside the UN in matters where such a UN-
brokered outcome would be impossible. To give one example of this Realpolitik, former U.S. 
Senator and isolationist Arthur Vandenberg stated that, “this is anything but a wide-eyed 
internationalist dream of a world state … It is based virtually on a four-power alliance”.7
It was the multilateral institutions such as the UN that, in the words of diplomatic historian 
Norman A. Graebner, “underwrote much of the postwar American-led international order”. 8 
He contended that, “these institutions, with the restraints they imposed, created a stable, 
agreeable environment which promoted the interests of all. At the same time, the rule-based 
structure of international cooperation minimized the possibilities of American hegemonic 
dictation”.9 From the multitude of standpoints taken on the UN by the sources cited in this 
research,	two	general	sides	can	be	established.	The	first	are	the	Antagonists, notable for their 
agitation for radical reform of the UN, with some tending towards abolition. The second are 
the Protagonists, who although supportive of the UN, still counsel moderate reform. This study 
is not deep enough to investigate whether every cited source agrees with each of the outlined 
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issues relevant to their side. However, there are enough evident similarities to enable the 
formation of the two categories. 
The positions of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington are relatively simple to ascertain. 
Although their respective treatises forecast the development of a future world order in spite 
of the UN, it is still possible to ascertain their stand on the UN through their works. The 
Clash of Civilizations is littered with references to UN failures, a feature that falls completely in 
line with Huntington’s thesis that different civilisations are only able to co-exist completely 
independently within their own spheres. To Huntington, the UN is rather toothless when 
it	comes	to	intercivilisational	rivalry;	best	exemplified	by	his	comment	that	“The	United	
Nations is no alternative to regional power, and regional power becomes responsible and 
legitimate when exercised by core states in relation to other members of their civilization”.10 For 
Huntington, universalist assumptions are “far too divorced from reality”11; the world cannot 
now and can never be harmonious if civilisations become interdependent. Huntington also uses 
the 1993 Vienna UN World Conference on Human Rights as an example of how civilisations 
are	just	too	different	to	work	as	one.12 Therefore, at the global level Huntington appears to be 
multipolar, and casting civilisations as homogenous units displays unilateralist tendencies. 
However, although he concedes that the U.S. is “the sole state with preeminence in every 
domain	of	power”,	Huntington	defines	unipolarity	as	a	system	with	one	superpower,	no	other	
major	powers	of	significance,	and	many	minor	powers.13	As	he	sees	other	major	powers	on	
the	world	stage,	he	defines	the	world	system	as	“a	strange	hybrid,	a	uni-multipolar	system”.14 
Within civilisations however, his positions are different. His belief that civilisations rely 
entirely on a core state is a unipolar assumption, whilst his belief in internal civilisational 
kinship displays multipolarity. Indeed, this is his preferred model for keeping the peace. 
He states, “the appropriate replacement for a global sheriff is community policing, with the 
major	regional	powers	assuming	primary	responsibility	for	order	in	their	regions”.15 This is 
intra-civilisational unipolar multilateralism. On a global scale, he does see a possible role for 
organisations like the UN, so long as it takes into account and works within his civilisational 
paradigm,	stating,	“the	United	States	needs	the	cooperation	of	at	least	some	major	powers.	
Unilateral sanctions and interventions are recipes for foreign policy disasters”.16 In effect, 
this	is	the	global	response	to	core	state	and	fault	line	conflicts.	It	must	be	concluded	that	
Huntington is an Antagonist, although if the UN were to evolve into a body that could 
manage his world system, he could easily become a Protagonist. 
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Fukuyama’s The End of History barely makes mention of the UN at all, the only real comment 
of	consequence	being	his	belief	that	a	successful	UN	would	resemble	NATO,	as	“a	league	
of truly free states brought together by their common commitment to liberal principles”, a 
Kantian dream.17 Since the publication of The End of History, Fukuyama has been vocal in his 
disgust that “dictatorial and human rights abusing” regimes have a say in UN matters. To 
him, this denies the body true legitimacy.18	This	places	Fukuyama	squarely	in	the	Antagonist	
camp, a categorisation made easier by his alignment (which according to him has lapsed 
in recent years) with the neo-conservative movement. Unlike Huntington, Fukuyama is an 
unswerving universalist, envisaging a multilateral world of liberal democracies where polarity 
rests with a political philosophy, more than with a particular nation state. However, as he 
portrays the U.S. as the beacon of this inevitable movement of history, he can be said to be 
a unipolar unilateralist dreaming of a future of nonpolar multilateralism. Here we can leave 
these	two	men	until	the	next	chapter	and	continue	the	analysis	of	the	debates	in	question.
The Antagonists share a general disdain for the UN, manifest in the multiple viewpoints, 
which	will	be	summarised	here:	The	UN	is	failing	at	its	perceived	objective,	ostensibly	to	
maintain global peace and security, in reality to push the U.S. foreign policy agenda, because 
this is what is believed will secure global peace and prosperity. If  the UN were to adopt a 
more pro-U.S. position, it would still need to ensure it does not impinge on American national 
sovereignty or challenge in any way American global hegemony. The UN model is outdated, 
tainted by non-democratic member states whose voting and lobbying contributes to laws and 
treaties the U.S. may need to abide by, and by the structural empowering of  ‘weaker’ members 
grossly disproportionate to their actual geopolitical balance of  power. Depending on the 
commentator, the inept and corrupt UN is in need of  serious reforms, including defunding or 
downsizing, with abolition a real alternative, although it is generally accepted that the domestic 
and international legitimacy the UN adds to U.S. international manoeuvres is valuable. A 
bellicose UN can be sidelined, only used when it can be guaranteed to agree with the U.S., 
by employing separate multilateral channels more in tune with U.S. interests, or by turning to 
unilateralism or bilateralism.
By contrast, the Protagonist argument appears less vehement. They believe a strong UN is 
imperative, both to sure up American interests in the world and to ensure the continued health 
of  the modern international world system which the U.S. was so instrumental in creating. A 
healthy	world	system	can	help	the	U.S.	to	deal	with	the	challenges	of 	the	twenty-first	century,	
such	as	enhancing	America’s	ability	to	fight	terrorism,	through	both	direct	action	and	the	
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softer approach of  humanitarian initiatives such as education and health.19 Reform is on the 
Protagonist agenda, but with far less vitriol, mostly concerning accountability and structural 
efficiency.	To	them	a	stronger	UN	would	create	a	world	system	more	palatable	to	member	
states whilst legitimising the U.S. interests that are promoted and debated within it.  
The assertion that the UN is failing at its mission, which includes the promotion of the 
U.S. foreign policy agenda, is pervasive amongst Antagonists. The machinations surrounding 
the	Iraq	War	exemplified	this;	the	hesitancy	of	some	members	of	the	UNSC	to	support	the	
invasion	came	to	be	seen	as	a	confirmation	that	their	priorities	lay	elsewhere.20 This feeling is 
best	emphasised	by	Dick	Cheney,	in	reference	to	the	lead	up	to	the	Iraq	War	in	2002-2003:	
I think the United Nations up until now has proven incapable of dealing with the 
threat that Saddam Hussein represents, incapable of enforcing its own resolutions, 
incapable of meeting the challenge we face in the 21st century of rogue states armed 
with deadly weapons, possibly sharing them with terrorists”. 21
It was in this environment, combined with the belief  that institutions like the UN couldn’t 
be assured of  supporting U.S. interests, that one highly public spectacle and one mundane 
congressional act, showcased the Antagonist belief  that the UN should never stand in 
America’s	way.	The	first	was	the	U.S.	National	Security	Strategy	2002	(NSS	2002),	an	audacious	
statement	of 	a	new	global	intent	with	enormous	significance	to	the	UN,	as	would	be	shown	
with	the	Iraq	War.	The	NSS—in	reality	a	more	audacious	update	of 	the	so-called	Wolfowitz	
Doctrine formulated by Cheney under the guidance of  Wolfowitz in the wake of  the 
liberation of  Kuwait in 199122—advocated pre-emptive power strikes and bluntly forbade that 
any nation “surpassing, or even equalling, the power of  the United States”,23	whilst	officially	
embracing ‘democracy’ as the key to the spread of  American values and practices, which 
would in turn promote U.S. interests.24 Nothing would stand in their way, and if  the UN could 
not provide support for American endeavours, the U.S. would have to take matters into their 
own hands. 
This	sentiment	was	repeated	in	the	brazenly	entitled	but	never-ratified	United States International 
Leadership Act (2003), co-sponsored by Congressmen Lantros and Dreier.25 The targets of this 
bipartisan	legislation	were	multilateral	institutions	and	the	UN	was	placed	squarely	at	the	
top of the list.26 Dreier commented, “this legislation will provide the State Department with 
the tools it needs to aggressively pursue American interests and security at these multilateral 
institutions”.27 Both manoeuvres displayed strong exceptionalist tendencies; evoking the 
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sentiment that what’s good for America is good for the world. Most sources cited here display 
some of these traits, although few spell it out. It seems that Antagonists believe that America’s 
status as sole remaining superpower combined with expansive and unchallenged power 
growth	was	a	confirmation	of	America’s	exceptionalism.	Such	a	power	expression	can	be	seen	
in the following sombre assessment by Robert Kagan when he stated that America, “must 
refuse	to	abide	by	certain	international	conventions	that	may	constrain	its	ability	to	fight	
effectively & it must support arms control, but not always for itself. It must live by a double 
standard”,28 which determines a role for organisations like the UN, out of the way of the U.S.29 
Antagonists openly believe the UN should be helping the U.S. when it comes to foreign 
policy.30	The	question	of	whether	that	UN	support	is	really	necessary	is	often	answered	in	the	
negative. During the 2000 U.S. Presidential Campaign, the then advisor to George W. Bush, 
Condolezza Rice derided the idea, which she attributed to the Clinton administration, “that the 
support of many states—or even better, of institutions like the United Nations—is essential to 
legitimate exercise of power”.31 To involve institutions like the UN would hinder that exercise, 
as the former Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld said, “the worst thing you could do is to 
allow a coalition to determine what your mission is”.32
Even	if	the	UN	did	a	better	job	of	furthering	American	interests,	the	Antagonists	contend	
that such action better not come at a cost to American sovereignty or damage in any way 
the American global hegemonic position. An illustrative example of one of numerous UN 
initiatives strongly attacked by Antagonists, concerns UN institutions with international 
judicial	powers,	namely	the	International	Criminal	Court	(ICC)	and	the	International	Court	
of Justice (ICJ). When the ICJ intervened on behalf of Mexican citizens on death row in 
Texas in 2007, there was outrage amongst the Antagonists (indeed, outrage directed towards 
President Bush for assenting to the court’s decision).33 This was clearly regarded as an 
impingement on U.S. sovereignty by a potential global competitor, and could not be tolerated. 
It was framed as an ‘all of the world vs. us’ scenario. This incredulity was mirrored during 
the debates about the ICC, a body seen as a clear threat to both sovereignty and hegemony, 
as noted by David Davenport from the Hoover Institute, “A criminal court of universal 
jurisdiction	created	by	one-third	of	the	nations	of	the	world,	representing	one-sixth	of	its	
population,	constitutes	a	major	power	play”.34 To Antagonists, that American sovereignty is 
sacred is taken for granted.35
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A “United Nations that seeks to impose its presumed authority on the American people, 
without their consent, begs for confrontation and—I want to be candid with you—eventual 
withdrawal”.36 So pled Republican Senator, Jesse Helms in January 2000. It has been claimed 
by Jan Nederveen Pieterse that a stronger UN, especially one aided in that task by the US, 
“would imply stepping down from its pedestal of world leadership”.37 Which raises a great fear 
held by some Antagonists—that of a world government, in the form of a more-powerful UN, 
dictating terms to the U.S. that they would be obliged to follow. From the Protagonist ‘side’, 
Hillary	Clinton	rejects	the	fear	of	the	UN	as	a	world	government	out	of	hand,	
It was precisely to address this fear that Presidents Truman and Roosevelt and Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill created the Security Council veto for the “P-5” … Without 
that veto power, it would have been as weak as the old League of Nations; without that 
veto	the	U.S.	Senate	would	have	rejected	the	UN	Charter	as	it	had	the	League.38
The Antagonists’ unease about the UN and its potential power to dictate to the U.S. is 
compounded	by	the	fact	that	non-democratic	member	states	wield	a	degree	of	UN	influence,	
including	those	considered	to	be	flagrant	abusers	of	human	rights,	such	as	Syria	and	Libya.	
Some	Antagonists	are	infuriated	that	such	member	states	can	chair	committees,	influence	
or even vote on laws and treaties that have the potential to affect the U.S.39 One idealist 
proposal	often	floated	is	a	form	of	a	“United	Nations	of	democracies”,40 a cause taken up 
by John McCain, who hopes for the bringing together of “democratic peoples and nations 
from around the world in one common organization: a worldwide League of Democracies. 
This would be … like-minded nations working together in the cause of peace, (which) could 
act where the UN fails to act”.41 Noted harsh UN critic Charles Krauthammer expands this 
ideal to add that such a League should only be made up of ‘friendly’ democracies, a point 
entirely in line with The End of History.42 The Bush Administration position is to coerce 
the UN into taking up the U.S. goal of the worldwide spread of democratic governments. 
Indeed, they even made an effort to do this through the UN—at the UN General Assembly 
in 2004—by proposing the creation of a “UN Fund for Democracy”, which would have put 
“democracy on the same institutional footing as world hunger, children’s rights, and economic 
development”. 43 There is no dispute that the UN has many non-democratic members and 
a	number	of	less-than-salubrious	ones.	It	is	notable,	however,	that	within	the	confines	of	
these	debates,	democracy	is	equated	with	freedom,	and	that	being	democratic	makes	a	nation	
more inclined to support the U.S. This latter opinion does take into account that vigorous 
resistance	to	the	U.S.	attempts	to	gain	UN	legitimacy	for	the	Iraq	War	came	from	other	
democracies, such as France and Germany.44 
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Not only is the UN regarded by the Antagonists as being burdened by undemocratic 
members,	its	very	structure	empowers	weaker	member	states	to	‘fight	above	their	weight’,	
where “decision making authority …  no longer corresponds to the distribution of power”.45 
To	Antagonists,	the	UN	is	no	longer	reflective	of	the	actual	geopolitical	balance	of	power 
(a complaint shared by Huntington in A Clash of Civilizations),46 resulting in impingements 
on American sovereignty by nations that should never be in a position to do so. In the words 
of Krauthammer, 
From the dawn of history to the invention of the U.N., it made not an ounce of 
difference	what	a	small,	powerless,	peripheral	country	thought	about	a	conflict	
thousands of miles away. It still doesn’t, except at the Alice-in-Wonderland United 
Nations, where Guinea and Cameroon and Angola count … It is only slightly less 
absurd	that	we	should	require	the	assent	of	France.47
Donald Rumsfeld has also criticised the UN regarding the non-democratic regimes and their 
ascension to chairs and committees, citing the example of the Libya to head the Commission 
on Human Rights.48 The case of John Bolton provides the perfect insight into the Bush 
Administration’s line on this issue. Bolton has been publicly scathing about the UN for a 
number of years. During a speech at the Global Structures Convocation in New York in 1994, 
Bolton famously said, “There is no United Nations. There is an international community that 
occasionally can be led by the only real power left in the world, and that’s the United States, 
when it suits our interests, and when we can get others to go along”.49 In 2000, he further 
commented, “If I were redoing the Security Council today, I’d have one permanent member 
because	that’s	the	real	reflection	of	the	distribution	of	power	in	the	world”.50 In 2005, he was 
made a recess-appointed U.S. Ambassador to the UN.
Bolton did not reserve his scorn for the balance of power within the UN. Out of the mass of 
commentators who chide the UN for being hopelessly inept and corrupt, Bolton is one of the 
most colourful, 
If you lost ten stories today, it wouldn’t make a bit of difference. The United Nations 
is	one	of	the	most	inefficient,	intergovernmental	organizations	going.	UNESCO	
is even worse, and others go downhill from there. The fact of the matter is that 
the international system that has grown up…has been put into a position of hiring 
ineffective people who do ineffective things, that have no real world impact.51
The call for UN reform has ‘become a mantra’ for those who are interested in the future of the 
UN, regardless of the side of the debate.52 It is a “top priority” of the Bush Administration.53 
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Working against the perceived interests of the U.S. whilst being structurally broken and 
corrupt has led to many calls for the extension of the practice of defunding (where UN dues 
were withheld by the U.S., often as a negotiating tactic)54 to complete defunding. That the 
lowest paying 130 countries together contribute less than one percent of the budget at $19,000 
annual	dues	per	country	is	cited	as	justification.55 When this is combined with the fact that the 
U.S. pays approximately 22% of the UN budget (proportionately more for UN peacekeeping 
operations),56 many Antagonists are driven to argue along the lines of ‘what does the U.S. 
get in return?’ One of the leading critics of UN funding is Pat Buchanan, who complained 
that	the	money	does	not	buy	influence	but	in	fact	encourages	competition	to	the	U.S.,	“The	
U.S. funded superstate has succeeded only in draining our coffers, belittling our values, and 
diminishing our international standing”.57
Some Antagonists hope that the UN, as a result of its ‘failures’, will be diminished or fall 
apart, with the only surviving UN bodies the one’s inoffensive to American foreign policy or 
public sensibilities. This was outlined by Richard Perle, then Chairman of the White House 
Defence	Policy	Board,	when	commenting	on	the	Iraq	War	in	an	article	gleefully	entitled,	
“Thank God for the death of the UN”. He stated that Hussein,
will	go	quickly,	but	not	alone:	in	a	parting	irony,	he	will	take	the	UN	down	with	
him. Well, not the whole UN. The “good works” part will survive, the low-risk 
peacekeeping bureaucracies will remain, the chatterbox on the Hudson will continue 
to bleat. What will die is the fantasy of the UN as the foundation of a new world 
order. As we sift through the debris, it will be important to preserve, the better 
to understand, the intellectual wreckage of the liberal conceit of safety through 
international law administered by international institutions.58 
Many on the Antagonist ‘side’ grant the UN a single positive characteristic, that it confers a 
much-needed domestic (and to a lesser extent international) political legitimacy on American 
action;	something	Fukuyama	pushed	for	after	it	became	clear	that	the	current	Iraq	intervention	
was not doing well.59	Indeed,	during	the	lead	up	to	the	Iraq	war	some	members	of	the	Bush	
Administration (publicly at least, and notably not Dick Cheney) were keen to promote the UN 
as the answer to the crisis, displaying a brash degree of political pragmatism considering their 
overall viewpoints towards the organisation.60 Although some commentators claim that many 
Americans	find	it	odd	that	American	defence—as	the	Iraq	crisis	was	presented	by	the	Bush	
Administration—requires	UN	approval,61 polls consistently showed during the run up to the 
Iraq	War	that	UN	approval	was	sought	by	the	majority	of	the	American	public.	For	example,	
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in a February 2003 poll conducted by CBS News, 64% of respondents agreed that the “US 
needs	to	wait	for	the	approval	of	the	United	Nations	before	taking	action	against	Iraq”, 	and	
“62% said the United States, should wait and give the United Nations inspectors more time.62 
These	findings	are	consistent	with	other	studies	taken	at	the	time.63 The difference might be 
explained by the public perception of a ‘defence effort’.64 The legitimacy of UN cooperation 
is	not	just	to	satisfy	domestic	opinion,	as	claimed	by	Krauthammer,65 many UN members take 
UNSC decisions seriously, especially the smaller ones, and some formulate their foreign policy 
positions only after waiting for UNSC decisions.66 
Most Antagonists analysed here believed that employing or encouraging separate multilateral 
channels more in tune with US interests could sideline the UNSC. The U.S. has been doing 
this for some time now anyway; Jan Nederveen Pieterse notes how the U.S. prefers to deal 
with	certain	issues	through	the	World	Bank	and	IMF,	where	its	vote	is	stronger	due	to	financial	
voting rules.67 The policy of the Bush Administration is to work with the most favourable 
institution depending on the circumstance, and if none exists, to modify an existing one or 
create a new one, as noted in NSS 2006.68 The argument that the “UN is one tool of many”, 69 
indicates	that	the	influence	of	the	UN	(especially	the	UNSC)	can	be	minimized	by	skirting	
around it,70 a position consistent with a belief in a “League of Democracies”. In other words, 
whichever organisation is chosen, it should be a veritable rubber-stamp when needed for U.S. 
foreign	policy.	Other	calls	are	frequently	made	along	similar	lines,	be	they	for	“pragmatic	
partnerships”,71 or “regional concerts” with ‘other great powers’.72
Two general criticisms of these arguments of the Antagonists need to be raised before moving 
on to analyse the much less complicated Protagonist argument. It is impossible to escape the 
conclusion that the Antagonists believe that the UN has been detrimental to the U.S. and that 
the U.S. wields little power in the UN. A brief look at the historical record suggests otherwise. 
The U.S. has often found great success in the UN by ‘throwing their weight around’. They 
have been very successful at lobbying,73 and use funding as a tool for getting the UN reforms 
they want74—at one point in 1999 they were in arrears by $1.5 billion.75	Secretary	General	Kofi	
Annan felt compelled to report on Middle East progress directly to the U.S. Congress, a gross 
transgression of protocol.76 They have used retribution as a coercion tool, for example when 
the	Yemenis	voted	against	the	first	Gulf	War	resolution.	
No sooner had the Yemeni ambassador put down his hand after voting against the 
resolution, the U.S. Ambassador was at his side saying, “that will be the most expensive 
‘no’ vote you ever cast”. The remark was picked up on an open U.N. radio microphone, 
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and broadcast throughout the building and ultimately around the world. So three days 
later, when the U.S. cut its entire aid budget to Yemen, the world took notice.77
The preceding cases are only a few of countless examples of the U.S. wielding its power in 
the UN. When considered in light of what U.S. foreign policy action has occurred, it is not 
as if the UN has actually stopped the U.S. from doing something it would otherwise have 
done.	Examples	include	how	the	U.S.	has	continually	ignored	strong	UN	majority	opinion	on	
Israel, Vietnam, Grenada and Panama, among others;78 opinion that made no difference to 
American positions on these issues. Cuba offers another example. In the 1990s, the General 
Assembly condemned the crusade against Castro by 138-3,79 yet to this day only minor 
policy changes have taken place, and only on the fringes. Even operating within the UN 
orbit, the U.S. can get what it wants much of the time and knows it, as notably conceded by 
Krauthammer,	when	referring	to	the	first	Gulf	War,		
The United Nations is guarantor of nothing. Except in the formal sense, it can hardly 
be said to exist. Collective security? In the gulf, without the United States leading and 
prodding, bribing and blackmailing, no one would have stirred.80
The same comment can be made with regards to the pressure to stop UN weapons 
inspections	in	Iraq	in	2003,81	the	implementation	of	the	Iraq	‘no-fly	zone’	or	the	probe	into	the	
‘Oil-for-food’ program.82 Krauthammer best outlines the leverage of the U.S. in this comment 
made	during	the	lead	up	to	the	Iraq	War	in	2003.
The	United	Nations	is	on	the	verge	of	demonstrating	finally	and	fatally	its	moral	
bankruptcy and its strategic irrelevance: moral bankruptcy, because it will have made 
a mockery of the very resolution on whose sanctity it insists; strategic irrelevance, 
because the United States is going to disarm Saddam anyway.83
An	analysis	of	the	Protagonist	position	is	infinitely	more	straightforward,	which	stands	to	
reason as they are in the position of wanting to strengthen or improve an existing system 
that,	philosophically	if	not	necessarily	operationally,	they	are	satisfied	with.	On	the	whole	they	
have much less to complain about. The primary argument amongst this group is that a strong 
UN is imperative, both to shore up American global interests and to maintain the health of 
the	modern	world	system,	(coincidentally	mostly	designed	and	influenced	by	the	U.S.).	This	
group still calls for reform, but with a different intensity to the Antagonists, and shares their 
view that engaging with the UN can proffer legitimacy to U.S. actions both domestically and 
abroad, but from an entirely less cynical perspective. Much of their argument can be traced to 
a	position	defined	by	John	Van	Oudenaren	as	‘unipolar	multilateralists’,84 who believe that a 
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strong international focus and respect for other nations’ opinions, combined with the pull of 
soft power, is a much more effective way to both maintain the western world power system 
of which the UN is such an integral part and also to ensure the continued U.S. dominance of 
world affairs.85
The leading intellectual proponents of this position are Professors Joseph Nye and John 
Ikenberry. Nye is the originator of the term soft power, which is a vital component of the 
Protagonist position,86 and an approach he believes will ensure continued American leadership 
at	a	much	lower	financial	expense.87 Ikenberry is of the same ilk, with a stronger focus on 
expansive multilateral diplomacy.88 On the political side Hillary Clinton and General Wesley 
Clark	are	strong	Protagonists.	Clinton,	in	particular,	believes	the	US	global	position	requires	a	
strong UN,89 and is passionate in her condemnation of the anti-UN rhetoric that surrounded 
the	Iraq	War	debate,	notably	for	the	comment	“to	blame	the	U.N.	was	like	to	blame	a	building	
on what happens inside it.” 90 She was of the opinion that the UN worked as it was meant to 
during that diplomatic crisis. She is in the minority who still see the UN as an organisation 
whose decisions are the overall responsibility of its members.91 General Clark has a slightly 
different take on the UN. On the current issue of Iranian nuclear proliferation, he argued that 
the U.S. should be leading the world community through the UN because U.S. power gives it 
the legitimacy to do so.92 To him the U.S. might as well try leading from the front at the UN 
for a change.93 
Linda Jamieson from the Centre for Strategic & International Studies adds perhaps the most 
reasoned comment in all of the debates, stating that the proof is there that the original goals 
of the UN are best achieved “when the world stands together, even when the outcome is 
insufficient	or	the	problem	goes	unsolved”. 94 Regardless of this, Protagonists still want to see 
reform of the UN, including Hillary Clinton, who sees the value in overcoming the UN’s 
“flaws	and	inefficiencies’.’95	and	Ikenberry,	who	comments	that	such	reform	will	be	difficult	
due to the nature of the UN but worthy of the effort.96 Barack Obama is more subdued about 
the UN but displays both strong multilateral tendencies and a clear understanding of a need 
for UN reform.97 This group also understands the legitimacy of U.S. action that is conferred 
by UN approval. In the words of Ian Hurd, “When the United States mobilises the legitimacy 
of the Council behind its interests, it becomes easier to win support of third-parties … This 
in reality may be an illusion … but if it is an illusion that works, then it is worth investing in”.98 
Sharia Tharoor from the UN explains further from a non-U.S. perspective, with reference 
to	the	Iraq	War	debate,	“the	Councils	refusal	to	serve	as	a	rubber	stamp	for	Washington	will	
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give any future support it lends to the United States greater credibility.99 She adds that had, 
“the Security Council been able to agree that force was warranted, it would have provided 
unique	(and	incontestable)	legitimacy	for	U.S.	military	action”.100 
Protagonists disagree with the Antagonist notion that the UN is a threat to U.S. sovereignty, 
most	eloquently	put	by	Madeleine	Albright,	who	famously	stated	in	a	2003	Foreign Policy article 
that such notions were,
Balderdash.	The	United	Nations’	authority	flows	from	its	members;	it	is	servant,	not	
master. The United Nations has no armed forces of its own, no power of arrest, no 
authority	to	tax,	no	right	to	confiscate,	no	ability	to	regulate,	no	capacity	to	override	
treaties, and—despite the paranoia of some—no black helicopters poised to swoop 
down upon innocent homes in the middle of the night and steal lawn furniture.101
Albright,	in	the	same	article	refers	to	the	relatively	low	fiscal	investment	the	U.S.	makes	
with the UN every year, stating the Protagonist position that such investment is more than 
worth it, especially when compared to what the U.S. spends every week on defence.102 The 
Protagonists believe that such investment is worthwhile, showing they consider that the UN, 
although	designed	for	a	1945	world,	can	still	be	highly	effective	in	the	twenty-first	century.103
Whether one wants to see the UN prosper, or “wither of its own irrelevance”,104 the common 
belief of both Antagonists and Protagonists is that the UN should be either promoting U.S. 
foreign policy interests or working with the U.S. to further those interests. This deviates 
somewhat from the original philosophy behind the formation of the UN as stated in Chapter 1, 
Article	1	of	the	UN	Charter,	which	outlines	as	objectives	the	maintenance	of	“international	
peace and security”, “collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace”,	“conformity	with	the	principles	of	justice	and	international	law”,	the	development	
of	“friendly	relations	among	nations	based	on	respect	for	the	principle	of	equal	rights	and	
self-determination of peoples”, the achievement of “international co-operation in solving 
international problems” and “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all”.105	It	would	be	naïve	to	think	that	the	signatories	to	the	UN	
Charter did not have national interests in mind, nor that these are absent from their day-
to-day dealings with the UN to this day. However, the effectiveness of the UN starts from 
the	top.	The	U.S.	is	by	far	the	major	source	of	funding	of	the	UN	and	the	dominant	global	
power regardless of what measurement is used, yet their management of the UN is notable 
for self-interest; they have in recent years strayed from the soft power approach. If the U.S. 
is prepared to use the UN to further it’s own foreign policy goals, it can hardly be surprising 
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that other nations have followed suit. It is no wonder the original aims of the UN have 
become	somewhat	muddied.	It	carries	a	huge	global	significance	when	the	U.S.	tries	to	use 
the UN for furthering its own aims. 
Another	significance	of	this	is	the	movement	to	promote	the	spread	of	democracy	throughout	
the world, a stated goal of the current U.S. Administration, in fact of almost all people cited 
in this study. Behind the aforementioned push to encourage the UN to foster the spread 
of democracy amongst its members, many commentators have cited the special place of 
‘peace’, ‘security’ and ‘freedom’ in the UN.106 On analysis, here it can be concluded that the 
cited commentators see promoting democracy as the only formula to achieve such noble 
goals.	Yet,	‘peace’,	‘security’	and	‘freedom’	does	not	necessarily	equate	to	democracy,	in	
fact,	history	suggests	that	such	terms	are	in	conflict	as	much	as	they	are	interlinked.	Both	
the UN Charter107 and the UN International Declaration of Human Rights108 do not make 
one single reference to ‘democracy’, yet it seems to be accepted across the spectrum of this 
American debate that the UN was always meant to promote democracy. Any treaty agreed 
to by the likes of Joseph Stalin and Chiang Kai-Shek was hardly likely to be promoting the 
formation of democracies. The inspiration behind the foundation of the UN may have been 
to	avoid	another	large-scale	global	conflict,	but	the	politically	ideological	means	to	do	so	were	
noticeably absent, unless one considers striving for peace and harmony a political ideology. 
This too suggests a disconnect with the original intention of the UN.
Another disconnect with the original intent of the UN is more typical of the Antagonist 
side.	The	belief	that	to	secure	peace	may	require	war	is	alluded	to	(quite	obtusely)	in	Articles	
43 to 51, Chapter 5 of the UN Charter;109 however, these are clearly in response to extreme 
provocation and are intended as tools of last resort. The UN recognised the contradiction 
inherent in the concept of waging war to secure the peace. U.S. foreign policy, especially 
after September 11, 2001, does not recognise this difference; in fact, it promotes the very 
opposite as a viable strategy. This was a strong point of contention during the diplomatic 
manoeuvrings	at	the	UN	over	Iraq	in	2002-2003.	A	telling	comment	by	Jeremy	Rabkin	
succinctly	sums	up	this	whole	change	in	attitude,	showing	just	how	far	some	in	the	U.S.	have	
left the original ideals of the UN behind.
In	practice,	awaiting	approval	from	the	Security	Council	would	mean	leaving	Iraqis	
under the murderous regime of Saddam Hussein. Europeans certainly deplored mass 
murder—at least in 2003. But as in the past, most Europeans held that peace must take 
priority over freedom {author’s emphasis}.110
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The debates in America about what part the UN should play in the ‘new world order’, have 
been intensifying since the end of the Cold War. The participants, ranging from politicians 
and academics to media pundits, have formed two general positions—the Antagonists and 
the Protagonists. The differences between the two groups appear stark, and are much more 
complex than their respective anointed categorisations suggest. However, what both sides 
share is a belief that the UN should either be actively promoting U.S. foreign policy interests, 
or be encouraged to help the U.S. in those endeavours. This highlights that the there is no 
room in the debates for the espousal of a position on the UN in line with the original UN 
objectives.	The	Realpolitik	sentiments	that	drove	the	U.S.	to	form	the	UN	have	taken	a	back	
seat in American discourse, overwhelmed by a belief that the UN should be at the forefront 
working for its global interests, as opposed to the U.S. working at the forefront in concert 
with	other	great	powers	in	order	to	ensure	a	conflict	the	likes	of	the	Second	World	War	will	
never be visited upon the world again. Top of a long U.S. foreign policy wish list for the UN 
is the promulgation of democracy. Seen by many in the U.S. as the panacea of the world’s 
ills,	democracy	is	considered	the	only	true	path	to	an	objective	that	was	intended	to	be	the	
product of negotiation and collective diplomacy. 
These debates concerning the role of the UN with respect to the U.S in the post-Cold 
War world have global repercussions, due to one simple characteristic. The intention of 
the	actors	involved	is	to	influence	the	formation	of	U.S.	foreign	policy	with	regards	to	the	
maintenance of a world favourable to America’s perceived global interests. Often, as has been 
proven through the implementation of policy by the U.S. Federal Government, they have 
been successful, an example being the NSS 2002. What is noticeable from the overview of 
the debates outlined here is an almost complete absence of contributions from professional 
historians,	more	specifically	practitioners	of	world	history.	Yet,	if	ever	there	was	a	discourse	
relevant to the practice of world history, this is it. Due to globalisation, American foreign 
policy	debates—as	they	frame	actual	policy	affecting	the	entire	world—raise	the	question	
whether	an	comprehension	of	world	history	as	a	subject	is	beneficial	in	broadening	the	
understanding of both the motives behind American action and the reaction of the rest 
of the world. 
Not only may world history make it possible to uncover all relevant and causal antecedent 
and related actions that frame the American foreign policy debates, as well as cultural and 
economic connexions, but individual world historical treatises that include a vision of the 
contemporary globe are talking about the very world arena that the debates are operating 
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within, led by The Clash of Civilizations and The End of History. Fukuyama and Huntington 
envisage a world order, one they have formed on the back of world history. The actors in 
this geopolitical discourse also envisage a world order. Is it possible for them to have 
formed their positions in spite of their world historical viewpoints? It is to this that we now 
turn.	World	history	discusses	arenas	of	global	significance,	with	global	reach	and	effects.	
Contemporary American debate on the role of the U.S. with regards to the UN in the post-
Cold	War	world	is	an	arena	of	global	significance,	with	global	reach	and	effect.	The	stars	
for	world	history	and	geopolitical	debate	are	in	alignment,	thus	there	should	be	benefit	in	
bringing them closer together.
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7.  A place for world history. Fukuyama, Huntington, 
world history and geopolitical discourse
All that remains is to analyse the American debates concerning the UN whilst considering 
world	history	writing,	specifically	via	the	bridge	provided	by	Francis	Fukuyama	and	Samuel	
Huntington	with	their	respective	master	works.	To	ascertain	the	absolute	degree	of	influence	
The End of History and The Clash of Civilizations had upon the actors in these debates would 
require	research	of	forensic	detail	beyond	the	scope	of	this	study.	However,	in	analysing	the	
positions of the Antagonists and Protagonists, we should be able compare them to those 
of Huntington and Fukuyama. In addition, the connections of the two men to the actors 
in	the	debates—be	they	people	or	organisations—whilst	not	proving	absolute	influence,	
per se, indicates a level of personal or professional connection strong enough to enable the 
drawing of preliminary conclusions. What this will reveal is that works reliant on a world 
historical foundation offer a vision of the current and future world, which in turn geopolitical 
debates are trying to shape, and that there is enough commonality to indicate that an active 
application	of	world	history	is	beneficial	when	considering	geopolitical	debates	of	global	
significance.	In	addition,	if	it	can	be	shown	that	world	histories	such	as	The End of History and 
The Clash of Civilizations offer varying relevant interpretations, with some of their concepts 
resonating in different streams of the debates, it shows that there is more than one world 
history narrative worthy of consideration. Indeed, the existence of multiple viewpoints can 
encourage the search for a third or a fourth opinion from another world history, or another 
work founded upon such.
A consideration of the Antagonist world-view shows a world whereby maintaining American’s 
position of power is thought to be in everybody’s best interests, regardless of whether that 
antagonism is shaped through a belief in global engagement or selective isolationism. Already 
the similarities to Fukuyama and Huntington’s theses are emerging. To Antagonists the 
UN in its current form impedes this; an undemocratic, multilateral body that takes into 
consideration far too many opinions of other sovereign states, the UN endangers American 
hegemony, or at the very least American power. As such, and in the world of modern 
globalisation, the UN has become an outdated body—set up to deal with the international 
challenges of the mid-twentieth century, hence unable to manage the complexities of the 
twenty-first.	The	Protagonists	also	want	American	interests	safeguarded,	but	are	willing	to,	
or are of the belief that, this is best achieved in a degree of harmony with the rest of the 
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world; a harmony that is achievable through bodies such as the UN. This is best described as 
a ‘one world, two world’ dichotomy: the Antagonist ‘one world’ preferring to see the rest of 
the	world	as	either	a	partner	in	delivering	national	benefit	or	a	harmless	and	inconsequential	
players on the sidelines of international affairs; the Protagonist ‘two world’ willing to 
genuinely embrace to a degree the outside world, although remaining true to national interest. 
Short of conducting personal interviews, which falls outside the scope of this work, 
establishing the actual world historical viewpoint of the actors representing both positions 
can only be assumed from analysis of their arguments and those of Huntington and 
Fukuyama. Even if the actors were interviewed to ascertain this, it is possible they don’t 
understand what world history is, let alone be willing to offer their take on it. However, there 
are many clues that can be found in their arguments. There are a few areas that stand out on 
the Antagonist side, the most interesting being their adherence to an exceptionalist agenda. 
American exceptionalism can best be described as the belief that the U.S. holds a special 
place	in	the	world,	granted	to	them	by	the	unique	circumstances	of	the	historical	narrative	
of their formation and growth, such as the development of their system of government with 
its enshrinement of freedom and liberty. Exceptionalism has a long history, since the Second 
World	War	it	was	driven	by	the	desire	to	find	not	only	a	different	place	in	world	history	for	
the	U.S.	but	a	unique	one,1 fuelled by a need to explain and contrast American success in 
light of Soviet oppression and European self-destruction.2 In effect, this helped explain why 
‘blessed’ America had escaped the horrors visited upon the rest of the world, a viewpoint that 
tended to group the rest of the world (although almost always Europe and Russia) as a single 
‘other’ in exceptionalist writings.3 An earlier characteristic supporting exceptionalism was the 
conquering	spirit	that	enables	the	U.S.	to	overcome	adversity,	a	spirit	displayed	from	Pilgrims	
through to frontiersmen, a theme popularised by Fredrick Jackson Turner, who claimed that 
America’s	unique	place	was	due	to	the	expansion	westwards,	through	the	“gate	of	escape	from	
the bondage of the past”.4 
There are strong religious undertones to American exceptionalism, not surprising since 
to exceptionalists it seemed as though history had indeed chosen them. These include the 
oft-repeated “City upon a Hill” remark by Puritan leader John Winthrop, which implied 
that the seventeenth century Puritan community should serve as a model for the rest of the 
world, notably rehashed by Ronald Reagan in his farewell address on leaving the Presidency 
in 1989,5 and John O’Sullivan’s introduction of “manifest destiny” in 1839, which indicated a 
divine mission for the U.S. expansion westwards to spread democracy throughout the land, a 
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form of democracy that was delivered by Providence.6 Examples of associated characteristics 
that believers feel make America exceptional and virtuous include free enterprise, laissez-
faire ideology, powerful private sector and small government, democracy, and American 
social values.7 Which, contended Fukuyama, was behind the move towards a more neo-
conservative American foreign policy in the new millennium, a move “premised on American 
exceptionalism, the idea that America could use its power in instances where others could 
not because it was more virtuous than other countries”.8 Standing behind all of this is the 
American form of liberal democracy and the belief that what makes America great is also 
right for the rest of the world. Liberal democracy made America great, it will make the world 
great, or at the very least it will make the world great for America. 
So far there is much in common with Fukuyama’s argument in The End of History, however, 
not to be left out is Huntington. His thesis of the incompatibility of civilisations creates 
a series of ‘others’, which could be combined as a single ‘other’ against the West along 
exceptionalist lines noted above (it must be said that this would be the case for any 
combination	of	civilisations	in	his	model).	Specifically,	since	Huntington	focuses	on	the	
future	health	of	the	West,	civilisations	that	may	appear	equal	in	his	thesis	are	actually	
contrasted to the West, which puts the West on a pedestal worth defending. Many antagonists 
also believe in the metaphoric clash of civilisations, if the machinations concerning the 
2003	invasion	of	Iraq—where	the	UN	played	a	central	role—as	well	as	American	dealings	
in general with non-Western cultures such as the Chinese and the Islamic, are considered. 
Krauthammer, for one, sees the U.S. in the “midst of a bitter and remorseless war with 
an implacable enemy that is out to destroy Western civilization”. 9 Another notable voice is 
Bernard Lewis, whose connection to both Huntington and the neo-conservative movement 
(particularly Dick Cheney, his close personal friend) will be expanded upon later in this 
chapter.10 The ‘clash of civilisations’ theme was taken up by the media as a simplistic 
explanation for the chaos surrounding the events of September 11 an opportunity they took 
with both hands.11 Although an opinion on Islamic civilisation doesn’t automatically raise the 
debates about the UN, it is important to remember that any action proposed in response to 
such opinions must take into account actions within the UN. The UN is inseparable from 
such machinations.
Where they differ is that for the most part Huntington urges separation; the management of 
international	affairs	should	be	limited,	focussing	on	ensuring	fault	line	serenity	and	conflict	
resolution	between	core	states	only	when	required.	Protagonists	such	as	Stanley	Hoffman	
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dispute the effectiveness of this, stating that wars within states are becoming more common, 
especially	where	there	are	no	fault	lines	that	equate	to	Huntington’s	civilisational	paradigm,	
such	as	in	Iraq,	Sri	Lanka	and	between	Croats	and	Serbs.12 John Gray shares this view, 
pointing out that whether or not wars, “are waged by the agents of sovereign states, the old, 
familiar logic of territories and alliances often impels members of the ‘same’ civilisation 
into enmity and members of different ‘civilizations’ into making common cause”.13 The 
Bush Administration went to great lengths as well, publicly and most likely through political 
expediency, to disavow the Clash of Civilizations thesis, with the exception of Fukuyama’s friend 
and former employer, Paul Wolfowitz.14 It is notable that the Protagonists share many of the 
same viewpoints as the Antagonists, although with their willingness to deal with and accept 
the UN as a genuine body with competing viewpoints lessens their exceptionalist tendencies. 
Both sides in the debate take into account the history behind the foundation of the UN 
foundation, and also consider the League of Nations. Indeed, to the Antagonist side, the 
League	of	Nations	is	often	cited	in	conjunction	with	the	UN	as	to	why	any	global	multilateral	
institution that accepts membership on the basis of sovereignty alone is bound to fail. Donald 
Rumsfeld made this very comparison when complaining about the UN in the lead up to the 
Iraq	War,	stating	that	it	“appeared	to	be	following	the	League	of	Nations	in	choosing	bluff	
over action”.15
Further light can be cast upon the connection of the debates to the two works or their 
supporting world history constructions by analysing characteristics where there is complete 
harmony or contradiction. The End of History and The Clash of Civilizations both contend that the 
UN is failing, a viewpoint shared almost unanimously on the Antagonist side, and to a lesser 
extent by the Protagonists. Fukuyama actually groups the UN and the League of Nations 
together for failing to provide collective security against the likes of Mussolini, the Japanese, 
Hitler and the Soviets,16 due to both bodies having no real power of enforcement or sanction.17 
The Clash of Civilizations even has a “United Nations, failures of” entry in the index, with six 
page references.18 Huntington’s belief that the UN, or a similar global organisation, could have 
a	role	in	managing	world	peace	along	civilisation	fault	lines,	fits	in	well	with	the	Protagonist	
position. He states, “Avoidance of a global war of Civilizations depends on world leaders 
accepting and cooperating to maintain the multicivilisational character of global politics”.19 
The actors in the debate, to differing degrees, believe the UN should be working to support 
U.S.	foreign	policy.	This	is	not	implicit	in	either	book,	but	it	is	easy	to	find	similarities	and	
differences to this position. Fukuyama contended that the UN would be better served if a 
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so-called League of Democracies, a common call among Antagonists and a stated goal of U.S. 
foreign policy, replaced it.20 This is a case of Fukuyama and the Antagonists sharing the belief 
that what’s good for the US is good for the entire world.
On the other hand, Huntington would be opposed to both the unilateral streak in current 
American foreign policy as well as, to a degree, the global inclusionism of the Protagonists, 
as both go against his beliefs that homogeneous civilisations should be kept apart to ensure 
peace and that world order management should be based upon the notion of separation. 
Both men advocate the use of separate channels other than the UN in international relations 
when	the	UN	proves	itself	unable	to	fulfil	its	mission.	For	example,	Huntington	warns	that	
if	no	changes	are	made	in	the	membership	of	the	UNSC	to	make	it	more	reflective	of	the	
civilisational balance of the globe, “other less formal procedures are likely to develop to deal 
with security issues”. 21	This	is	an	Antagonist	position	and	official	U.S.	foreign	policy	as	stated	
in	NSS	2003,	best	exemplified	by	the	formation	of	a	coalition	to	invade	Iraq	in	2003	outside	
the auspices of the UN.
Both Antagonists and Protagonists argue from the position that the U.S. should remain at the 
pinnacle of the world system and the UN, to be effective, should be a platform from which 
this can be achieved. The End of History, by tying the realisation of man’s thymos and ultimate 
freedom to liberal democracy, does this by stealth, as does Huntington, by ending his treatise 
with a guide to protecting the health of Western civilisation. Another theme that is consistent, 
this time between the Antagonists and Huntington, is that the UN might be of some use if 
it was, by circumstance or design, reduced to undertaking relatively safe, simple tasks such as 
the promotion of health and education and peacekeeping. This was the position of Richard 
Perle	when	lauding	what	he	saw	as	the	death	of	the	UN	over	the	issue	of	the	Iraq	War,	and	
on the peacekeeping side at least Huntington agrees, seeing the correct role for the UN as 
peacekeeping and international peace management, along the boundaries of civilisations and 
between the core states representing those civilisations. This, in effect, is an example of the 
Protagonist position, the use of diplomacy without imposition—an example of soft power—
to ensure peace with (in particular for Huntington) the Sinic and Islamic civilisations. 
It is clear that there are many similar characteristics between what people are communicating 
within the debates concerning the UN and what Fukuyama and Huntington are 
communicating through their respective books, which is natural as they are both concerned 
with a new world order. It must be remembered that both men formed their position after 
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constructing world history narratives that, in effect, supported their theses. In order to see 
whether the participants in the debates hold the similar world historical viewpoints as the 
two men, indeed any world historical viewpoints at all, it is important to see if there are any 
connections, both professional or personal, and also to see if actors in the debates are citing 
‘world history’ or ‘history’ in their pronouncements on the UN, or U.S. foreign policy in 
general. Neither of these will offer conclusive empirical proof that these two books were 
directly	influential	to	the	debates,	however,	there	is	enough	evidence	to	suggest	this	was	
highly	likely,	and	enough	to	justify	a	further	and	deeper	investigation	into	the	problem.	
The	first	of	the	two	writers	to	analyse	is	Francis	Fukuyama,	and	the	smoking	gun	here	is	
neo-conservatism. Neo-conservatism, originally a movement of mostly Jewish intellectuals 
from City College, New York, who strove to limit socialist or communist tendencies in 
government, or what Fukuyama calls “social engineering”.22 In the 1970s they became harsh 
critics of the then Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger’s geopolitical realism, as they believed 
dealing with non-democratic regimes like the Soviet Union legitimised them.23 After the end 
of the Cold War they pushed for an interventionist foreign policy reliant on American might 
to	fix	current	and	future	world	problems	that	impacted	on	U.S.	power.	This	was	caused	by	the	
belief that “all totalitarian regimes were hollow at the core and would crumble with a small 
push from outside”, 24 inspired by the demise of the Soviet Empire, and a contention that the 
actions of the Reagan Administration ‘won’ the Cold War.25 Fukuyama worked with Paul 
Wolfowitz, a noted neo-conservative intellectual, in the Reagan Administration, a relationship 
that would have a lasting impact on Fukuyama’s later reputation. He was also a member of the 
RAND Corporation at the same time as the likes of Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleeza Rice, 
and	more	importantly,	the	Project	for	a	New	American	Century	(PNAC).	The	PNAC	became	
notorious in 1998 when it sent a letter to the then President, Bill Clinton, advocating the 
invasion	of	Iraq,	with	objectives	that	seem	to	have	been	fulfilled	during	the	administration	of	
George W. Bush.  The letter included the following call, 
We believe the U.S. has the authority under existing UN resolutions to take the 
necessary steps, including military steps, to protect our vital interests in the Gulf. In 
any case, American policy cannot continue to be crippled by a misguided insistence 
on unanimity in the UN Security Council.26
This section of  the letter alone shows willingness, indeed a desire, to deal with problems 
outside of  the UN orbit, for that institution could no longer serve America’s best interests, 
placing	it	squarely	within	the	debates	discussed	in	this	work.	The	letter	is	notable	for	the	list	
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of  signatories, including John Bolton, Paul Wolfowitz, Robert Kagan, William Kristol, Richard 
Perle, Donald Rumsfeld—all actors in the debates analysed here—and, most importantly, 
Francis Fukuyama.27 
The signatories and associated members of the PNAC were well rewarded when the Bush 
Administration came to power in 2001; eleven of the eighteen signatories, plus further PNAC 
associates, were appointed to senior positions in the Administration, including Positions 1, 
2 and 3 at the Defence Department and Position 2 at the State Department.28 Notable again 
was the appointment of Fukuyama to the President’s Council on Bioethics, followed in 2002 
by his commissioned work for Wolfowitz at the Defence Department on a long-term strategy 
for the Global War on Terror.29 It is noticeable that since it became apparent the adventure in 
Iraq	was	not	going	to	be	the	unqualified	success	it	was	advertised	to	be,	Fukuyama	has	broken	
quite	publicly	with	PNAC	and	the	neo-conservative	movement.	He	has	even	gone	so	far	as	to	
downplay	entirely	the	significance	of	PNAC,	regardless	of	their	obvious	influence	within	the	
Bush Administration, stating in 2006 that: “Everybody points to these letters I signed, the 
Project	for	a	New	American	Century,	which	is	basically	just	Bill	Kristol	and	a	fax	machine”. 30 
Still, he still strongly defends his position as stated throughout The End of History on liberal 
democracy and forgives Wolfowitz to a degree, calling him an idealist and separating him 
from others in the movement interested in “the cynical pursuit of American advantage”.31 
These connections of Fukuyama to players in the debates, as well as similarities in arguments 
that	impact	those	debates	on	the	UN,	indicate	that	Fukuyama	had	a	degree	of	direct	influence	
over some actors in the debates.
The same is true of Huntington, although his connections may not be as personal as those of 
Fukuyama,	his	ideas	and	one	of	his	academic	mentors	also	place	him	squarely	within	debates	
concerning	the	Iraq	War,	which	are	integrated	with	debates	concerning	the	UN.	He	has	been	
a member of the Brookings Institute and the Council of Foreign Relations (indeed, he was 
a founder of Foreign Affairs), where he too had dealings with many actors in the debates. He 
also served on the board of the National Interest, with, amongst others, Irving and William 
Kristol, Paul Wolfowitz and Charles Krauthammer.32 The most important connection 
however, is with Orientalist scholar Bernard Lewis, and the related connection to three 
important Antagonists, Dick Cheney, Charles Krauthammer and Paul Wolfowitz. 
Huntington borrowed the term “Clash of Civilizations” directly from Lewis’ 1990 article 
entitled “The Roots of Muslim Rage”, 33 and it has been claimed the framework for his treatise 
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as well. Lewis believes that the West, a successor to what had been known as Christendom, 
is “in the last stages of a centuries old struggle for dominance and prestige with Islamic 
civilization”. 34 The pathway to victory in this struggle is to convert Islamic countries to liberal 
democracy, ironically an end result that would satisfy Fukuyama, although he has disagreed 
vehemently with the means advocated to achieve this. Lewis is of the belief that the Islamic 
world would accept democracy with open arms, basing this assumption on his experiences 
in Kemalist Turkey in 1950.35 Lewis also happens to be a great friend of Dick Cheney; he 
provided the Vice President with numerous historical lectures in 2002 and 2003 to verify the 
contention	that	Iraq	would	gladly	accept	liberal	democracy	American-style,	again	using	Turkey	
as an example.36	Indeed,	Lewis	has	been	cited	as	perhaps	the	most	significant	intellectual	
behind	the	push	to	invade	Iraq	in	2003.37 
Huntington noticeably spends much more space on Turkey in A Clash of Civilizations 
than	say	Africa	or	Latin	America,	although	in	contrast	to	Lewis	he	qualifies	it	as	a	torn	
country,38 however, he also offers it as an example of viable response to westernisation and 
modernisation through the imposition of liberal democracy.39 It is through liberal democracy 
that	Krauthammer	and	Wolfowitz	join	this	picture.	Krauthammer,	one	of	the	most	vitriolic	
Antagonist voices against the UN, is a strong devotee of both Huntington’s A Clash of 
Civilizations, calling it “scandalously brilliant”, 40 and Lewis’ paradigm that Arabs are capable 
of democracy.41 Wolfowitz is another who follows Lewis’ line, preaching that a democratic 
Turkey is a “useful model for others in the Muslim world”.42 Their version of a successful 
liberal democracy also comes from Lewis, who in turn took it directly from Huntington. 
Lewis states, when referring to Huntington, “you can call a country a democracy when it has 
made two consecutive, peaceful changes of government via free elections”.43 
The	evidence	of	Huntington’s	influence	is	not	conclusive	beyond	reasonable	doubt.	Trial	
by association is a dangerous path, however with Huntington as with Fukuyama there is 
again	more	than	enough	evidence	to	justify	further	investigation	and	to	draw	preliminary	
conclusions. As for the relevance of the aforementioned connections to the debates 
concerning	the	UN,	there	was	and	could	never	have	been	debate	on	the	Iraq	War	without	
the UN being a part of them. Indeed, each of the positions noted above contains an attitude 
toward the UN. It can be argued, for example, that because of Antagonist beliefs about the 
UN it was decided by U.S. policy makers that the best way to achieve their goals in the Middle 
East	was	to	first	try	to	garner	international	legitimacy	through	UN	support,	and	then	bypass	
the UN when it became apparent that would be impossible. The UN is inseparable from the 
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debate	on	Iraq.44 With regards to world history, it is clear that both Fukuyama and Huntington 
share many characteristics with those involved in the debate, a position that developed from 
constructing a world historical foundation upon which their respective treatises relied. The 
following illustration is an attempt to chart the connections between the two men and the 
actors in the debates, and will show that there is enough to draw a preliminary conclusion 
that The End of History and The Clash of Civilizations, based as they are upon world history, were 
influential	in	U.S.	debates	concerning	their	place	in	the	new	world	order	and	the	role	of	the	
UN within that new environment.
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There	is	one	final	area	to	investigate.	Do	the	actors	in	geopolitical	debate	invoke	history	when	
presenting the reasoning behind their actions or proscriptions? If so, this would indicate that 
an	understanding	of	history	might	be	of	benefit	to	the	recipient	of	these	messages.	There	
is	no	better	place	to	start	than	at	the	top,	with	George	W.	Bush.	The	President	frequently	
invokes history in speeches on foreign policy, most often regarding the current struggle in 
Iraq	and	the	war	on	terror.	In	his	first	speech	to	the	UN	General	Assembly	after	the	events	
of September 11, 2001, Bush evoked history in a manner startling in its End of History-like 
connotations: “We face enemies that hate not our policies but our existence, the tolerance 
of	openness	and	creative	culture	that	defines	us.	But	the	outcome	of	this	conflict	is	certain.	
There is a current in history, and it runs toward freedom”.45 Another with similar undertones 
was a speech to the Council for Foreign Relations in 2005, where he stated that, “One of 
the great lessons of history is that free societies are peaceful societies, and free nations give 
their citizens a path to resolve their differences peacefully through the democratic process. 
Democracy	can	be	difficult	and	complicated,	and	even	chaotic”.46
History	is	actually	used	by	Bush	as	a	justification	for	American	foreign	policy,	as	exemplified	
by the following excerpt to a 2005 speech which displays a brash application of manifest 
destiny: “We will meet the challenge of our time. We will answer history’s call with 
confidence	–	because	we	know	that	freedom	is	the	destiny	of	every	man,	woman	and	child	
on this earth”.47 Dick Cheney is also one to invoke history, whilst pushing the capitalism/
democracy agenda, this time in a speech honoring Margaret Thatcher,
When the 20th century is seen years hence through the long lens of history, two 
defining	themes	will	surely	stand	out:	the	clashes	between	socialism	and	capitalism,	
and between totalitarianism and democracy. When future generations learn how 
capitalism	triumphed	over	socialism,	you	will	figure	prominently	in	the	story	as	a	
central hero.48  
In fact, history is invoked in a great deal of American discourse on foreign policy. An example 
already outlined in this work is the comparison made by Antagonists of the UN to the League 
of Nations. History is often raised in other foreign policy discourses, such as those concerning 
the	war	on	terror,	where	efforts	to	set	guidelines	for	an	eventual	U.S.	withdrawal	from	Iraq,	
or even to talk with regimes or organisations deemed to be terrorists, are met by cries of 
appeasement and comparisons to Neville Chamberlain’s actions at Munich in 1938.49 Donald 
Rumsfeld, for one, has commented that critics of George W. Bush critics had not “learned 
history’s lessons”, asking whether Americans can “truly afford to believe that somehow, some 
way, vicious extremists can be appeased?”50
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It is clear that the Antagonists and Protagonists share many positions on the makeup of 
the current and future world order with Huntington and Fukuyama, and that both men are 
connected to actors in the debates analysed in this work. Whilst not proving beyond absolute 
doubt that The End of History and The Clash of Civilizations have	either	influenced	these	actors	
or that they appreciated the respective world historical foundations, there is enough evidence 
to warrant a deeper study. This is especially true when those world historical foundations are 
taken into consideration, and the fact that history is evident in geopolitical discourse of global 
significance.	Fukuyama	and	Huntington	have	written	world	history-based	treatises	concerning	
the	current	and	future	world	order,	and	the	actors	in	the	debates	are	striving	to	influence	
policy concerning that same current and future world order. There are so many common 
indicators between world history and geopolitical debate that it is safe to form a conclusion 
that knowledge of world history and world history writing is vital when considering 
geopolitical	debates	of	global	significance.
A place for world history. Fukuyama, Huntington, world history and geopolitical discourse
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Conclusion 
It was into the relative geopolitical vacuum following the end of the Cold War that Francis 
Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington wrote The End of History and The Clash of Civilizations 
respectively, in order to establish their vision of the future world order. Fukuyama foresaw 
the coming of worldwide liberal democracy—the metaphoric end of history, as people’s 
universal	desire	to	share	in	the	benefits	of	modernisation,	which	he	argued,	can	only	be	
satisfied	by	universal	adoption	of	liberal	democracy.	Huntington	outlined	the	dangers	of	
inter-civilisational	dispute	and	offered	some	potential	prophylactics	against	global	conflict.	
Many of the ideas contained within these two books can be located within the U.S. debates 
concerning its role in the world, and the relationship of the UN to that position, and to more 
specific	debates	that	by	their	very	nature	involve	the	UN	as	a	component	consideration,	such	
as	debates	over	the	Iraq	War	or	the	war	on	terror.	The	ideas	in	The End of History and The 
Clash of Civilizations that corresponded to debate positions were founded upon world historical 
constructions—a viewpoint of how a world history narrative has proceeded to a point in 
time where the conditions outlined have come into play, or will do so in the future. Which is 
not surprising, as world history writing creates narratives of understanding, outlining all of 
the events and peoples that have contributed to that history up to a point in time. The point 
in time for the American debates is now and extends into the future, a temporal match for 
Huntington’s thesis and, to a lesser degree, that of Fukuyama. 
In a globalised world, geopolitical debates such as the one outlined in this study have an 
impact in all four corners of the world. Yet, there have been few connections made between 
such	globally	significant	machinations	and	the	world	history	that	lies	behind	them,	which	
is surprising considering global geopolitics and world history share the same arena—planet 
earth.	This	raises	many	questions,	not	the	least	of	which	is	what	are	the	viewpoints	of	world	
history	held	by	the	actors	in	these	debates,	people	influencing	or	making	policy	that	impacts	
on all of the worlds people? It is almost impossible to believe that actors in such debates 
do not have a personal view of world history, regardless of whether they connect it to the 
discipline	of	world	history	or	just	reach	it	by	osmosis.	If	we	could	unlock	these	visions,	it	
should be possible to form a better understanding of their motivations. At the same time, 
would	a	general	comprehension	of	world	history	better	empower	people	to	judge	what	they	
see, read or hear from actors in these debates? For example, when the U.S. was engaged in 
what turned out to be futile efforts to garner a UNSC resolution authorising the invasion 
of	Iraq	in	2003,	events	that	dominated	American	newspaper,	radio	and	television	coverage	
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for several months, would the public have reacted differently? Would France, which was 
singled out as an irrational barrier to American interests, have been lumped together with old 
foes Russia and China, as U.S. enemies? Would Americans have for the most part accepted 
without	question	the	demonisation	of	a	fellow	liberal	democracy	that	shared	with	the	U.S.	
an eighteenth century revolutionary ideal?—a demonisation that included such timeless 
spectacles as the renaming of French fries to “freedom fries”? A more thorough consideration 
of world history should result in a more comprehensive understanding of what is happening 
in the world, and how and why things have reached that point.
This study offers a preliminary look into the connection between world history and 
geopolitical	debates	of	global	significance.	There	is	enough	evidence	of	a	reliance	on	world	
history by actors in the debates to warrant further and deeper study. Such study would ideally 
involve personal interviews with the relevant participants in the debate—politicians, pundits, 
academics and policy advisors—to ascertain their thoughts on world history. Although it 
is entirely likely that many will have no opinion on world history as an academic endeavor, 
per	se,	it	is	difficult	to	believe	these	actors	are	without	opinion	on	the	world	history	or	that	
they have formulated their geopolitical ideas and positions in a historical-free bubble. Such 
interviews	would	strive	to	uncover	what	they	have	read,	what	has	influenced	them,	and	from	
where	they	have	acquired	their	historical	knowledge,	even	to	discover	what	they	might	have	
been told—especially relevant in the case of representative politicians, where much of what is 
espoused is the product of backroom speechwriters and advisors. In this case it would also be 
of	benefit	to	investigate	the	people	behind	the	people	involved	in	the	discourses.	
In addition, the base of world history writers considered needs to be opened up well beyond 
Fukuyama and Huntington, to include any world historian, anyone writing from a world 
historical perspective, or works by those loosely termed traditional historians, who have had 
an impact on these actors. It is already clear from this study that the historical notion of 
American	exceptionalism	has	had	a	significant	impact	on	many	of	the	participants,	and	whilst	
not technically a trait of world history, has massive implications for world history as a whole. 
Further study would also need to consider antecedent versions of modern world history, 
such as universal history. To give an illustrative example, if a politician such as John McCain 
is promoting a League of Democracies, it is important to uncover whether this opinion 
has come from Kant, from Fukuyama, a combination of the two, or from another source 
altogether.	Such	a	study	should	complete	the	reconnection	of	the	globally	significant	study	
of	world	history	and	the	globally	significant	debates	on	geopolitics,	and	alert	the	world	that	
knowledge of world history is important when considering global geopolitical debates.
Conclusion
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The debates analysed here are merely a case study, generated to prove the point that world 
history has an impact on geopolitical debate (and vice versa). It is important to extend this 
exercise	to	other	contemporary	geopolitical	debates	of	global	significance,	such	as	those	
surrounding the rise of China and India, and the global tactics of the European Union, to 
take but a few examples. Such debates, by the very nature of the modern world system, must 
take the role of the UN into account. Which is why the UN was chosen as the case study 
to represent geopolitical debate in this study. There can be no such discourse in the era of 
modern globalised world without the UN as a constituent element, for the same reasons as the 
most powerful country on earth—the U.S.—must always be a consideration; the reach of the 
UN	and	the	U.S.	in	global	affairs	is	metaphorically	infinite.
There	is	one	final	caveat	to	the	success	of	such	a	study;	the	academic	world	history	profession	
must	be	prepared	to	re-acquaint	itself	with	geopolitics	as	a	subject	of	equal	worthiness	to	
all the non-state world and global histories. Part of this reconciliation involves a willingness 
not to run from world histories or works founded upon world history that may be 
methodologically contentious, or reminiscent of the ‘bad old days’. It must be remembered 
that both Fukuyama and Huntington are not professional historians, nor is Amy Chua. 
However, if works such as The End of History and The Clash of Civilizations are being widely 
read	and	discussed	and	are	having	an	influence	in	debates	that	affect	how	the	world	is	run,	
they are worthy of consideration by world historians, because of their use of world history 
to support their theses and their relation to it. Although the world may be metaphorically 
debordering, the nation state still exists and shows no sign of disappearing any time soon. 
We all still live under its auspices, from paying taxes to holding the passports that enable the 
world travel so instrumental in the mechanism of globalisation. Many of the professional 
world historians analysed in this work see a very humanistic purpose for the writing and 
study of world history, in helping people comprehend the contemporary world and how 
and why it evolved. A reconnection of world history and geopolitics might actually broaden 
interest in world history and enhance its chances of surviving as a viable discipline in its own 
right. Consideration of visions of the world system, be they the ‘one world’ vision like that 
of Fukuyama and the Antagonists, the ‘two worlds’ of the Protagonists, or ‘multiple worlds’, 
such as that of Huntington and his disciples of his ‘clash of civilization thesis’, are all viable 
concepts with points in their favour and points against. Perhaps such a reconnection will 
increase the appeal of world history to both the general public and to universities around the 
world, upon whom its very survival as a viable academic discipline is reliant, as a worthwhile 
exercise in understanding the world as it is today.
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Abstract 
After the end of the Cold War, the United States was arguably left as the sole remaining 
superpower, however, the form the new world order would take in this environment remained 
unclear. In light of this, there has been much debate within the U.S. since 1991 considering 
the role of the U.S. in the modern—and globalised—world; and its relationship to the United 
Nations, the only true global representative institution which could conceivably compete with 
the U.S., has been centre stage in this discourse. It was in this arena of uncertainty that two 
works having world historical foundations appeared: The End of History and the Last Man, by 
Francis Fukuyama; and The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of the World Order, by Samuel 
Huntington. Ostensibly treatises based upon political philosophy and international relations 
respectively, both works were founded on, and entirely reliant upon, their readings of world 
history. They offered a vision of the contemporary and future world order in line with that 
of many of the actors in the aforementioned debates—indeed, many of their ideas still 
resonate within this living and breathing discourse. All indications are that world history and 
geopolitical	debate	should	be	a	natural	fit,	as	can	be	seen	from	the	reception	and	influence	
of both treatises, yet this connection seems to have been sidelined and the world history on 
which both writers base their respective works overlooked, none the least by practitioners 
of world history themselves. An understanding of the world historical foundations behind 
The End of History and The Clash of Civilizations should result in a more comprehensive 
understanding	of	these	specific	debates.	This	leads	to	the	question:	In	this	global	age	
how vital is engagement with world history, both it’s writing and the historical narratives 
themselves, in understanding the motivations of and inspiration behind the positions of 
actors	in	geopolitical	debates	of	global	significance?
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Abstract
Mit Ende des Kalten Krieges verblieben die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika umstritten 
als die wohl einzige Supermacht, indessen sich die Gestalt, welche die neue Weltordnung in 
diesem Umfeld annehmen würde, als unklar erwies. Angesichts dieser Entwicklung fand in 
den USA seit Beginn der Neunziger eine angeregte Debatte über die Rolle der Vereinigten 
Staaten in der modernen—und globalisierten—Welt statt; auch deren Beziehung zu den 
Vereinten Nationen, die einzige wirklich globale, repräsentative Institution, die für die USA 
möglicherweise eine Konkurrenz darstellen könnte, stand im Mittelpunkt dieses Diskurses. 
In dieser Arena der Ungewissheit erschienen zwei Arbeiten, die auf Weltgeschichte als ihrer 
theoretischen Basis gründeten: The End of History and the Last Man von Francis Fukuyama 
und The Clash of Civilizations and The Remaking of the World Order von Samuel Huntington. 
Obwohl beide Traktate augenscheinlich in den Disziplinen politische Philosophie und 
internationale Beziehungen Fuß fassen, beruhen und verlassen sie sich in Wahrheit 
gänzlich	auf	deren	jeweilige	Auffassung	von	Weltgeschichte.	Sie	zeigten	eine	Vision	der	
gegenwärtigen	und	zukünftigen	Weltordnung,	die	sich	mit	jener	von	vielen	der	Akteure	in	
der	oben	erwähnten	Debatte	deckt—ja	zahlreiche	derer	Ideen	finden	noch	immer	Nachhall	
in diesem lebhaften Diskurs. Alle Anzeichen deuten darauf hin, dass Weltgeschichte und die 
geopolitische Debatte naturgemäß zusammenpassen sollten, was am Beispiel der Rezeption 
und	des	Einflusses	beider	Abhandlungen	gesehen	werden	kann.	Trotzdem	scheint	diese	
Verbindung	beiseite	geschoben	und	die	Weltgeschichte,	auf	die	beide	Autoren	ihre	jeweilige	
Arbeit stützen, übersehen worden zu sein—nicht zuletzt von Praktikern aus dem Fach der 
Weltgeschichte selbst. Die Erkenntnis der weltgeschichtlichen Fundierung von The End of 
History und The Clash of Civilizations sollte	ein	umfassenderes	Verständnis	dieser	spezifischen	
Debatten zur Folge haben. Dies lässt die Frage aufkommen: Wie unabdingbar ist im globalen 
Zeitalter eine Beschäftigung mit Weltgeschichte, sowohl ihrer Niederschrift als auch ihren 
historischen Erzählungen selbst, für das Verständnis der Motivation und Inspiration, die den 
Positionen der Akteure in geopolitischen Debatten von globaler Bedeutung zugrunde liegen?
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